

KOSOVO - KOSOVA

Coming to Terms with the Problem of Kosovo: The Peoples' Views from Kosovo and Serbia

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About the Poll

This survey of public opinion was undertaken to find out what the people of Kosovo and Serbia believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the region.

The research was carried out by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe from Thessaloniki in Greece, KosovaLive in Pristina and Beta Media Center in Belgrade with advice from Dr. Colin Irwin from the Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland.

Dr. Irwin collected the questions for the survey through extensive interviews (with Serbs and Albanians) in Kosovo and Serbia during May and June 2005. The questionnaire was then administered to approximately 1200 people from Kosovo and 1200 people from Serbia to complete representative samples in terms of age, gender, social class, political and ethnic affiliation and geographical area for a total of approximately 2400 interviews. To make sure all groups were brought into this programme of research these interviews included special 'booster' samples of Serbs in Kosovo enclaves and Serb IDPs in Serbia. The interviews for the poll were conducted between August 26th and September 2nd 2005. In Serbia the fieldwork was carried out by Strategic Marketing Research of Belgrade and in Kosovo by Strategic Puls Research of Tirana, Albania.

The results are being made available for public access on the internet, in the local newspapers and in reports that will be given to all the political parties in Kosovo and Serbia as well as all the major international organisations working in the region.

Topics covered include the problems faced by the people, their politicians and the international community in the region, what will happen if these problems are not properly addressed and a range of solutions to deal with these problems.

For further technical details see Methodology, Questionnaire and Demographics in the Appendix.

About the Project

The Albanian-Serb Information Exchange Forum

Three project partners - the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) in Thessaloniki, the Beta Media Center in Belgrade and KosovaLive agency in Pristina have jointly established an internet based, interactive news resource called, The Albanian-Serb Information Forum. The Forum is locally owned and uses three languages: Albanian, English and Serbian. The actions of the project consist of creating an Internet Forum, providing a news service in three languages, conducting opinion polls, and convening two conferences for journalists. Re-establishing direct information exchange channels between Albanians and Serbs is crucial in the year 2005 and www.kosovakosovo.com will do just that.

Objectives

The overarching and long-term objective of this project is to broaden and strengthen the common ground between Serb and Albanian media and journalists as well as the respective societies at large. The idea is to help enhance a robust peace process between the two communities which will in one other shape or form inevitably take place in the immediate future. A public support for it could be enhanced through the power of the media.

The specific project objectives are:

- To facilitate and improve dialogue between Albanian and Serb journalists and media and their readers;
- To combat stereotypes that Serbs and Albanians have of each other by providing informed and reliable news;

The above objectives would be achieved through the following time-bound project aims:

- To re-establish direct information channels between Albanians and Serbs;
- To improve the quality and accuracy of the news in the Albanian and Serb communities in the region and in the diaspora;
- To increase the availability to the public of good quality news on the other community;
- To increase the communication and contacts between Albanian and Serb journalists;
- To de-polarise the extreme views that Serbs and Albanians have of each other through conducting and publishing an opinion poll.

Project partners

CDRSEE: The Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) was founded in The Netherlands in 1998 by private citizens from the SEE region, and from Western Europe and the United States. The aim of the CDRSEE is to foster democratic, pluralist, and peaceful societies in Southeast Europe by advocating principles of social responsibility, sustainable development, and reconciliation among the peoples in the region. The CDRSEE currently has six full time staff members, and five interns. The CDRSEE activities raise awareness via publications, workshops, textbook analysis, academic conferences, opinion polls, training sessions, and cultural and artistic programmes. The CDRSEE is currently running four major projects: the Joint History Project, Disclosing Hidden History: Lustration in the Western Balkans, Our Town Our Future, the Serb Albanian Information Exchange Forum, as well as several smaller initiatives.

KosovaLive news agency: Since the end of 2000, when it was launched, KosovaLive has been the main local provider of daily news from Prishtina and Kosova with a focus on grass roots issues of everyday life in English and Albanian. It was established as an unaffiliated nonprofit NGO and supported by contributions from a consortium of donors . The staff consists of 10 journalists and 4 translators, while KosovaLive also employs 15/20 stringers/correspondent throughout Kosovo and in Albania , Macedonia and Montenegro . Starting 2001, KosovaLive provides a subscription paid service to media and organizations. The first category includes print and broadcasters, among them most relevant local radio stations in towns throughout Kosova, for most of which KosovaLive is the main source of information. The other category includes local and international governmental and non-governmental institutions/organizations.

Beta Media Center: Beta Media Center is the not-for-profit arm of BETA news agency, established in 2004. The Center's Council brings together a number of prominent public figures intent on strengthening the freedom and responsibility of the media in Southeastern Europe . The Beta Media Center has taken over the agency's non-commercial activities, which aim at raising public awareness of current affairs and, particularly, of contentious political, economic and social issues. The Beta news agency began operating in 1994 and has meanwhile grown into one of the leading news agencies of the Western Balkans. The agency has over 600 customers at home and abroad, and a staff consisting of 250 journalists, translators, technicians and office personnel. Beta also has a well developed network of correspondents in Southeastern Europe and elsewhere in the world. For more information on Beta visit www.beta.co.yu

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Executive Summary

About the research

Using methods well tried in Northern Ireland and other parts of the Balkans a public opinion poll was simultaneously run in both Serbia and Kosovo to find out what the people there believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the region. Critically the poll has several distinctive features.

1. The questions were drafted through in depth interviews with politicians, journalists and academics from both Kosovo and Serbia. The questions asked were therefore the questions the people of Kosovo and Serbia wanted answers to.
2. The same questions were asked in both Kosovo and Serbia so that comparisons could easily be made on all matters of concern to both peoples.
3. The research and all the results are being made public to ensure high professional standards, stimulate public debate, assist negotiations and foster positive public diplomacy.

The problems

1. Amongst Kosovo Albanians the top priorities remain Kosovo's final status and the economy while for Kosovo Serbs it is the power supply and security. For Serbia Serbs it is security and missing persons and for Serb IDPs it is the return process. Fortunately both communities do recognise these problems as problems, particularly the economy, although their priorities are different.
2. With regards to final status Kosovo Albanians believe lack of agreement is holding back the economy, creating instability and could lead to a new war if Kosovo remains part of Serbia. Serbs believe an independent Kosovo will be unsafe and will lead to an exodus of Serbs from Kosovo. But both communities believe there should be a role for Kosovo Serbs in negotiations.
3. When it comes to relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs they share a common concern about the negative effects of the war with regards to missing persons and so many killed. They also share a concern about those involved in the war being in government or the police. But each side also believes the other still wants a greater Albania or greater Serbia and while Kosovo Albanians still consider past discrimination to be a major problem Serbs are concerned that Kosovo Albanians will not condemn Albanian ethnic violence.
4. Everyone wants improvements to the criminal justice system including a multiethnic police service where required. However, Kosovo Albanians do not seem to share the same level of very deep concern that Serbs have with regards to their security and lack of freedom of movement.
5. Serbs are more worried about the future if these problems are not solved. Particularly organised crime. However neither Serbs nor Kosovo Albanians believe the international community will isolate them.

The solutions

6. Kosovo Albanians want to be treated as equals by Serbs and Serbs want to be made welcome in Kosovo and Pristina. In this regard both communities are able to agree on a significant list (but not all) of confidence building measures ranging from student exchange, support for Serbian TV, a common Balkan history curriculum etc. etc.
7. With regards to the future of Mitrovica Kosovo Albanians and Serbs can only agree to disagree. One group want the city divided the other united. It seems to have come to symbolise the problem of Kosovo in microcosm. But both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs want all possible measures taken to strengthen the rule of law including police reform, a special property court and the prosecution of all ethnic crimes with the highest possible penalties.
8. With regards to negotiations and procedural issues Kosovo Albanians want a referendum in Kosovo and Serbs want a referendum in Serbia. This is to be expected as is a desire by both communities for negotiations to proceed in as open a way as may be possible. Everyone also wants to see Kosovo Serbs represented at the negotiating table.
9. The general consensus over most matters of procedure breaks down when it comes to matters of substance. Eighty one percent of Kosovo Albanians consider full independence 'essential' while 69% of Kosovo Serbs, 65% of Serbia Serbs and 73% of Serb IDPs consider Kosovo remaining part of Serbia to be 'essential'. However, beyond these initial negotiating positions there is scope for some flexibility in the context of a continued NATO presence, EU membership, economic development, meeting Standards before final status and Serbs being able to retain their citizenship.
10. When looked at jointly, from the perspective of both communities, the least unacceptable option for a constitutional package seems to be Kosovo as a protectorate of the EU at only 20% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 58% for Kosovo Serbs, 60% for Serbia Serbs and 58% for Serb IDPs.
11. Similarly more Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs would elect to stay in or return to Kosovo as a EU protectorate at 83%, 45% and 27% respectively. Under the ideal conditions of complete safety, choice of citizenship and full equality these figures rise to 83% for Kosovo Albanians, 71% for Kosovo Serbs and 61% for Serb IDPs.

Conclusion

As all the questions on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs would indicate, along with all the questions on matters of security, the ideal solution of complete safety, choice of citizenship and full equality is at best an aspiration that could be strived for. It is a dream that would take at least a lifetime to achieve if ever. But what can be achieved is real progress towards this ideal in terms of social and political reform in combination with suitable constitutional arrangements that will go as far as such arrangements can to ensure security for all. By bringing together the most workable elements of all the questions reviewed in the second half of this report this can be done and this must be the objective of the negotiations ahead. Implementation, however, will take time. Fortunately both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs welcome the involvement of the international community, particularly the EU, whose influence in the region is clearly on the rise.

Introduction

Social and political conflicts are a major source of instability in the world today. They affect not just the countries in which they occur, but very often engulf their neighbors and have a potential to throw entire regions into turmoil. Even if settlements are reached they often remain unstable resulting in a return to violence or necessitating ongoing intervention by the international community. Tragically Kosovo may be such a case. But the potential for the success of peace processes can be greatly increased when all sections of society are provided with opportunities to become active partners in their own peace process. Imposed solutions and deals done 'behind closed doors' and backed up with international pressure and force may bring temporary relief to apparently intractable problems. But 'home grown' solutions that have the widest possible support amongst the various elements that make up a society are essential for progress towards long-term stability and peace.

In the modern political world of international norms, globalisation, mass media and an increasingly well-informed electorate, solutions to political, economic and social problems require a discourse and decision-making process that engages with the leadership, civil society and population at large. Achieving such a process in divided societies is problematic and requires every possible assistance and support. However, by taking advantage of some features that characterise and shape contemporary societies, it is possible to initiate a process of 'top-down and bottom-up' communication and 'centre-out to polarities-in' decision-making that can bring divided communities closer to a consensus as to how they can best manage their affairs. By pro-actively testing public opinion as part of the search for compromise and common ground, it is possible for negotiators to build consensus and strengthen the potential for political stability, economic prosperity and the degree of social cohesion necessary to sustain them.

To this end, nine surveys of public opinion were conducted in support of the Northern Ireland peace process between April 1996 and February 2003. Critically the questions for eight of these polls were drafted and agreed with the co-operation of party negotiators to enhance the peace process by increasing party inclusiveness, developing issues and language, testing party policies, helping to set deadlines and increase the overall transparency of negotiations through the publication of technical analysis and media reports.

In so far as it was possible the parties were given 'ownership' of the research so that they would take the results seriously. Each party to the negotiations nominated a member of their team to work with the facilitator on the polls. Questions were designed to test party policies as a series of options or preferences from across the social and political spectrum. The moderating voice of 'the silent majority' was thus given expression while extremist positions were demonstrated to be marginal with little cross community support. All questions, options and preferences had to be agreed as not being partisan or misleading. From the drafting of these questions to sample design, ethics, timing and publication, the programme of research was decided by all the parties and they were encouraged to take the work in any direction that they believed would be helpful to the peace process.

The focus of the research was on problems, solutions and policies for conflict resolution as opposed to inter-community attitudes and values. Personality and 'popularity contest' questions were avoided unless it was clear that running such a question would help to solve a problem. Questions were 'pitched' at what most people could understand most of the time NOT at the lowest common denominator. All relevant issues were covered and NO irrelevant issues. All the results were also made publicly available effectively giving the wider community a 'seat at the negotiating table' and exposing the research to the highest standards of peer review and public scrutiny. There was no 'cherry picking' of the results. Everyone had to deal with all the issues that were raised as part of what became a 'pre-negotiation problem solving exercise'.

This inter-track activity, that extended across the political spectrum to all the major parties, civil society and the public at large helped to build a consensus for the Belfast Agreement that lead to a successful referendum and subsequent period of increasing stability and peace. In an effort to internationalize this

work a book 'The People's Peace Process in Northern Ireland' was published by Palgrave/MacMillan; numerous papers and reports have also been made available on the project website at peacepolls.org; a poll was completed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2002, Bosnia Herzegovina in 2004 and Alexandros Lordos initiated a similar programme of research in Cyprus in 2004 and 2005. The Northern Ireland methods can and have been applied successfully elsewhere.

The poll reviewed in this report is a first attempt to replicate these methods in Kosovo and Serbia. Uniquely the same set of questions has been asked in both societies and representatives of these different communities wrote them. Politicians, journalists, academics, civil servants and business people all made a contribution to drafting the questions and all sections of the two populations had an opportunity to answer them.

It is not up to me to say if this or that solution is the best solution to deal with the problems that must be faced by the people of Kosovo and Serbia or even if this or that question is the right question to be asked. It is up to the people of Kosovo and Serbia and their elected representatives to do this. This report contains a wealth of interesting responses to the questions that the people of Kosovo and Serbia wanted answers to. It provides a basis for much rich and fruitful discussion for the people, their elected representatives and the negotiating teams who must now shoulder the responsibility of their respective communities' future security and prosperity.

In this regard I hope they will find this report of value and I wish them every success in their endeavours.

Colin Irwin.

Belfast, October 2005.

Part 1

Problems

1. The range of problems

The question

Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

From a list of 31 items (see tables 1.1 to 1.6) the top five priorities for Kosovo Albanians are Kosovo's final status at 87% very significant followed by unemployment at 85%, the weak economy at 75%, corruption at 70% and education standards also at 70%.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Kosovo's final status	87%
2	Unemployment in Kosovo	85%
3	The weak economy of Kosovo	75%
4	Corruption in Kosovo	70%
5	Kosovo education standards	70%

In polls run by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and others final status and unemployment have also come out as the top priorities for Kosovo Albanians. This result is consistent with those results.

Serbian priorities

For Serbs living in Kosovo the top priority is the power supply at 78% very significant. But for Serbs living in Serbia it is security at 83% very significant and for Serb IDPs in Serbia it is missing persons and the return process for IDPs both at 84%.

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Kosovo power supply	78%	1	Public and personal security in Kosovo	83%	1	Missing persons	84%
2	Public and personal security in Kosovo	74%	2	Missing persons	76%	2	Return process of IDPs/refugees	84%
3	Return process of IDPs/refugees	72%	3	Organised crime in Kosovo	72%	3	Public and personal security in Kosovo	83%
4	Kosovo's final status	65%	4	Kosovo's final status	72%	4	The rights of victims	82%
5	Missing persons	62%	5	Return process of IDPs/refugees	71%	5	Kosovo's final status	79%

These results are also consistent with similar polls run in Kosovo which place personal security at the top of the Kosovo Serb list. But it is only number 2 here behind power supply which does not even get into the top five for Serbia Serbs and Serb IDPs. For all Serbs the other top items are the rights of victims, Kosovo's final status and organised crime.

Others

The priorities for the 'others' in both Kosovo and Serbia seem to reflect the views of the majority population in both places. Although, as minorities in both societies with a slightly different set of interests their top 5 priorities come out a little different with a stronger emphasis on unemployment (94% very significant in Kosovo) and Serb and Albanian relations (65% very significant in Serbia).

Very Significant - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Unemployment in Kosovo	94%	1	Public and personal security in Kosovo	71%
2	Kosovo's final status	82%	2	Organised crime in Kosovo	69%
3	Kosovo power supply	77%	3	The rights of victims	67%
4	Organised crime in Kosovo	75%	4	Missing persons	67%
5	The weak economy of Kosovo	68%	5	Serb and Albanian relations	65%

Some points of disagreement

49% of Kosovo Albanians consider the role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo to be of no significance while only 1% of Kosovo Serbs share this view. Conversely 19% of Kosovo Serbs consider the actions of the Kosovo government to be of no significance while only 1% of Kosovo Albanians share this view. Acknowledging and accepting the role of both the governments in Pristina and Belgrade as having a legitimate role in the affairs and future of the peoples of Kosovo seems to be problematic for a significant percentage of both communities in Kosovo.

Of no significance	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	49%	2%	4%	4%
The actions of the Kosovo government	1%	19%	7%	6%

Some points of agreement

Public and personal security came in at number 8 on the list of 31 items for Kosovo Albanians (65% very significant). So they share this concern with Serbs although it is not such a big problem for them. Power supply came in at 6 (69% very significant). Serbs are also concerned about the final status of Kosovo being 4th or 5th on their lists of priorities - and so on and so on. The point to be made here is that although everyone's order of priorities is different Albanians and Serbs seem to share, or understand or at the very least acknowledge each other's priorities. In all of this there is clearly a shared basis for discussion and points of negotiation. Reaching an agreement, however, may be quite another matter.

The other important conclusion to take away from this analysis is that nearly all of the 31 items in this list are recognised as being problems by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alike. Very few items are listed as being of no significance by one community or the other. But this list of items is very broad indeed ranging from security to sports facilities. With a tighter focus on the central points of disagreement between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs it may not be possible to sustain this degree of apparent consensus.

Table 1.1. Question 1 – Kosovo Albanian

	Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance
1	Kosovo's final status	87%	11%	2%	0%	0%
2	Unemployment in Kosovo	85%	13%	1%	0%	0%
3	The weak economy of Kosovo	75%	22%	3%	0%	0%
4	Corruption in Kosovo	70%	25%	4%	0%	0%
5	Kosovo education standards	70%	26%	5%	0%	0%
6	Kosovo power supply	69%	25%	5%	0%	0%
7	The actions of the Kosovo government	67%	23%	8%	1%	1%
8	Public and personal security in Kosovo	65%	30%	6%	0%	0%
9	The quality of Kosovo healthcare services	61%	36%	3%	0%	0%
10	Missing persons	54%	41%	4%	0%	0%
11	Organised crime in Kosovo	53%	40%	5%	1%	0%
12	Environment issues in Kosovo	51%	30%	11%	7%	0%
13	Irresponsible politicians	46%	37%	12%	3%	2%
14	Police reform in Kosovo	43%	33%	18%	5%	1%
15	Kosovo day care facilities	40%	32%	19%	8%	0%
16	The rights of victims	35%	45%	17%	3%	0%
17	The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications	35%	52%	12%	1%	0%
18	The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia	32%	47%	16%	4%	1%
19	Lack of prosecution of war crimes	31%	50%	16%	2%	0%
20	Ineffective criminal justice system	30%	44%	22%	3%	0%
21	Kosovo privatisation	28%	44%	25%	3%	0%
22	The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)	27%	44%	21%	6%	2%
23	Lack of cultural events in Kosovo	20%	40%	29%	11%	1%
24	Poor sports facilities in Kosovo	19%	37%	30%	13%	1%
25	Decentralisation of government in Kosovo	19%	34%	34%	11%	3%
26	Biased media in Kosovo	17%	40%	33%	7%	3%
27	Return process of IDPs/refugees	16%	45%	25%	10%	3%
28	Reconciliation	9%	18%	25%	31%	17%
29	Serb and Albanian relations	8%	28%	28%	31%	6%
30	Serb Albanian language barrier	6%	19%	28%	33%	13%
31	The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	5%	9%	16%	22%	49%

Table 1.2. Question 1 - Kosovo Serb

	Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance
1	Kosovo power supply	78%	17%	1%	1%	4%
2	Public and personal security in Kosovo	74%	24%	1%	0%	1%
3	Return process of IDPs/refugees	72%	24%	3%	0%	1%
4	Kosovo's final status	65%	27%	6%	1%	1%
5	Missing persons	62%	29%	1%	4%	4%
6	Organised crime in Kosovo	61%	31%	4%	3%	1%
7	The weak economy of Kosovo	53%	38%	3%	3%	3%
8	Unemployment in Kosovo	53%	31%	9%	2%	5%
9	The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia	52%	32%	11%	4%	1%
10	The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	52%	30%	9%	6%	2%
11	Environment issues in Kosovo	50%	26%	11%	7%	6%
12	Corruption in Kosovo	49%	31%	13%	3%	4%
13	Ineffective criminal justice system	48%	40%	7%	5%	1%
14	Lack of prosecution of war crimes	47%	35%	13%	4%	2%
15	The rights of victims	42%	43%	9%	3%	2%
16	The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications	39%	41%	16%	1%	4%
17	Kosovo privatisation	39%	32%	15%	12%	2%
18	Serb and Albanian relations	38%	33%	19%	7%	3%
19	Irresponsible politicians	38%	31%	22%	4%	4%
20	The quality of Kosovo healthcare services	36%	42%	17%	1%	4%
21	Kosovo day care facilities	36%	29%	20%	5%	10%
22	Decentralisation of government in Kosovo	36%	28%	20%	8%	9%
23	Reconciliation	34%	34%	19%	8%	4%
24	Biased media in Kosovo	34%	45%	12%	4%	5%
25	The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)	34%	42%	16%	6%	1%
26	Police reform in Kosovo	30%	39%	19%	8%	4%
27	Kosovo education standards	26%	45%	22%	3%	3%
28	Serb Albanian language barrier	21%	33%	25%	19%	3%
29	Poor sports facilities in Kosovo	21%	31%	29%	12%	8%
30	The actions of the Kosovo government	19%	29%	22%	12%	19%
31	Lack of cultural events in Kosovo	18%	37%	35%	7%	3%

Table 1.3. Question 1 - Kosovo Others

	Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance
1	Unemployment in Kosovo	94%	3%	3%	0%	0%
2	Kosovo's final status	82%	10%	5%	2%	0%
3	Kosovo power supply	77%	19%	4%	0%	0%
4	Organised crime in Kosovo	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%
5	The weak economy of Kosovo	68%	25%	6%	0%	0%
6	Public and personal security in Kosovo	67%	29%	3%	0%	0%
7	Missing persons	66%	32%	0%	2%	0%
8	The actions of the Kosovo government	60%	20%	11%	2%	6%
9	Kosovo education standards	57%	35%	3%	0%	5%
10	The quality of Kosovo healthcare services	56%	36%	8%	0%	0%
11	Corruption in Kosovo	45%	39%	3%	13%	0%
12	Lack of prosecution of war crimes	45%	45%	11%	0%	0%
13	Kosovo day care facilities	41%	41%	18%	0%	0%
14	Kosovo privatisation	40%	39%	16%	5%	0%
15	Environment issues in Kosovo	40%	33%	27%	0%	0%
16	Return process of IDPs/refugees	36%	39%	22%	3%	0%
17	The rights of victims	36%	41%	23%	0%	0%
18	The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications	34%	55%	11%	0%	0%
19	Irresponsible politicians	26%	43%	30%	0%	0%
20	Decentralisation of government in Kosovo	17%	26%	40%	17%	0%
21	Ineffective criminal justice system	17%	40%	43%	0%	0%
22	The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)	15%	42%	25%	18%	0%
23	Serb and Albanian relations	15%	16%	49%	18%	2%
24	The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	14%	14%	25%	10%	37%
25	Biased media in Kosovo	10%	43%	28%	19%	0%
26	Lack of cultural events in Kosovo	9%	38%	47%	6%	0%
27	Police reform in Kosovo	8%	44%	42%	4%	2%
28	The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia	5%	56%	30%	9%	0%
29	Poor sports facilities in Kosovo	3%	53%	28%	16%	0%
30	Reconciliation	3%	25%	18%	45%	9%
31	Serb Albanian language barrier	0%	9%	37%	48%	6%

Table 1.4. Question 1 - Serbia Serb

	Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance
1	Public and personal security in Kosovo	83%	13%	1%	2%	1%
2	Missing persons	76%	21%	2%	0%	0%
3	Organised crime in Kosovo	72%	23%	3%	1%	1%
4	Kosovo's final status	72%	21%	5%	1%	2%
5	Return process of IDPs/refugees	71%	21%	5%	2%	1%
6	Serb and Albanian relations	69%	21%	6%	2%	1%
7	Corruption in Kosovo	65%	26%	7%	2%	1%
8	The rights of victims	65%	28%	5%	1%	1%
9	Ineffective criminal justice system	65%	27%	6%	1%	1%
10	Unemployment in Kosovo	59%	24%	11%	4%	2%
11	Reconciliation	57%	23%	10%	5%	5%
12	Irresponsible politicians	57%	29%	9%	3%	1%
13	Lack of prosecution of war crimes	57%	29%	9%	3%	3%
14	Kosovo power supply	55%	31%	10%	3%	1%
15	The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	51%	29%	10%	6%	4%
16	Police reform in Kosovo	50%	33%	11%	4%	2%
17	The quality of Kosovo healthcare services	48%	31%	13%	6%	2%
18	Kosovo education standards	45%	32%	14%	6%	3%
19	The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia	45%	27%	14%	7%	7%
20	Biased media in Kosovo	43%	34%	15%	6%	2%
21	Kosovo day care facilities	43%	32%	14%	7%	4%
22	The weak economy of Kosovo	40%	34%	14%	8%	5%
23	The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications	36%	36%	17%	8%	2%
24	The actions of the Kosovo government	36%	33%	16%	9%	7%
25	Decentralisation of government in Kosovo	35%	35%	17%	7%	5%
26	The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)	34%	27%	17%	13%	9%
27	Environment issues in Kosovo	31%	28%	19%	12%	9%
28	Kosovo privatisation	30%	31%	23%	9%	7%
29	Serb Albanian language barrier	29%	25%	21%	14%	11%
30	Lack of cultural events in Kosovo	20%	28%	26%	15%	10%
31	Poor sports facilities in Kosovo	13%	23%	29%	18%	16%

Table 1.5. Question 1 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance
1	Missing persons	84%	13%	3%	0%	0%
2	Return process of IDPs/refugees	84%	15%	1%	1%	0%
3	Public and personal security in Kosovo	83%	15%	1%	0%	1%
4	The rights of victims	82%	17%	1%	0%	0%
5	Kosovo's final status	79%	16%	5%	0%	0%
6	Organised crime in Kosovo	78%	17%	4%	0%	1%
7	Serb and Albanian relations	76%	11%	7%	6%	1%
8	Ineffective criminal justice system	75%	19%	4%	2%	0%
9	Kosovo power supply	72%	20%	7%	0%	0%
10	Corruption in Kosovo	71%	21%	4%	3%	1%
11	Lack of prosecution of war crimes	70%	25%	3%	2%	0%
12	Irresponsible politicians	68%	21%	7%	4%	1%
13	Reconciliation	67%	20%	5%	3%	4%
14	Biased media in Kosovo	65%	18%	14%	1%	1%
15	The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	62%	26%	5%	2%	4%
16	The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia	60%	22%	10%	7%	1%
17	Police reform in Kosovo	56%	21%	15%	5%	4%
18	Unemployment in Kosovo	55%	26%	16%	2%	1%
19	The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)	54%	21%	14%	8%	3%
20	The actions of the Kosovo government	51%	26%	12%	5%	6%
21	Decentralisation of government in Kosovo	50%	28%	14%	2%	6%
22	The weak economy of Kosovo	48%	33%	9%	6%	4%
23	Kosovo privatisation	47%	26%	13%	8%	5%
24	Serb Albanian language barrier	46%	20%	14%	12%	8%
25	The quality of Kosovo healthcare services	46%	28%	20%	3%	4%
26	The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications	43%	25%	22%	4%	5%
27	Kosovo education standards	42%	31%	19%	5%	2%
28	Kosovo day care facilities	41%	17%	26%	10%	6%
29	Environment issues in Kosovo	38%	27%	17%	13%	5%
30	Lack of cultural events in Kosovo	31%	17%	20%	15%	17%
31	Poor sports facilities in Kosovo	26%	12%	17%	22%	22%

Table 1.6. Question 1 – Serbia Others

	Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance
1	Public and personal security in Kosovo	71%	25%	1%	0%	4%
2	Organised crime in Kosovo	69%	25%	3%	2%	2%
3	The rights of victims	67%	22%	8%	2%	2%
4	Missing persons	67%	25%	7%	0%	2%
5	Serb and Albanian relations	65%	21%	5%	5%	3%
6	Reconciliation	65%	18%	6%	7%	4%
7	Ineffective criminal justice system	64%	28%	6%	0%	2%
8	Corruption in Kosovo	61%	27%	9%	1%	3%
9	Lack of prosecution of war crimes	61%	29%	6%	2%	2%
10	Return process of IDPs/refugees	60%	27%	10%	1%	2%
11	Kosovo's final status	59%	30%	8%	0%	3%
12	Kosovo power supply	58%	29%	11%	0%	2%
13	Unemployment in Kosovo	56%	25%	13%	4%	2%
14	Irresponsible politicians	55%	28%	9%	4%	4%
15	The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	45%	30%	14%	9%	2%
16	Police reform in Kosovo	43%	38%	12%	4%	3%
17	Kosovo education standards	43%	27%	19%	10%	2%
18	The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia	40%	30%	20%	4%	6%
19	The actions of the Kosovo government	39%	36%	12%	6%	6%
20	The quality of Kosovo healthcare services	38%	38%	18%	5%	2%
21	The weak economy of Kosovo	37%	38%	12%	7%	5%
22	The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)	37%	31%	18%	9%	5%
23	Serb Albanian language barrier	35%	29%	16%	8%	12%
24	Biased media in Kosovo	34%	40%	15%	6%	4%
25	Kosovo day care facilities	34%	35%	23%	3%	5%
26	The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications	34%	33%	25%	7%	2%
27	Decentralisation of government in Kosovo	26%	40%	23%	8%	3%
28	Environment issues in Kosovo	25%	28%	22%	15%	10%
29	Kosovo privatisation	24%	33%	30%	10%	3%
30	Lack of cultural events in Kosovo	18%	28%	28%	13%	13%
31	Poor sports facilities in Kosovo	14%	26%	28%	17%	15%

2. Kosovo's final status

The question

Now with regards to Kosovo's Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

Kosovo Albanian priorities

Unfortunately the sense of common understanding for the general problems that the people of Kosovo and Serbia have to deal with, illustrated in question 1, does break down when dealing with the sensitive topic of the final status of Kosovo here in question 2. From a list of 42 items (see tables 2.1 to 2.6) Kosovo Albanian priorities start with the failure to develop the Kosovo economy before final status is agreed at 46% very significant followed by keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war at 43%.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	46%
2	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	43%
3	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	42%
4	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	32%
5	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	30%

Serbian priorities

For Serbs in Serbia and Serb IDPs the top concern is that Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs at 74% and 93% very significant respectively. This item comes in 5th on the list for Serbs living in Kosovo at 78% very significant. Their top item is that an independent Kosovo will be less secure at 80% very significant. For Serbs in Serbia and Serb IDPs this item is second on their lists. Understandably Serb IDPs believe UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs at 80% very significant (5th on their list).

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	80%	1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	74%	1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	93%
2	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	79%	2	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	73%	2	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	88%
3	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	79%	3	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	73%	3	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	83%
4	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	79%	4	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	71%	4	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	81%
5	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	78%	5	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	70%	5	UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	80%

Already a bit of a pattern seems to be emerging here where Serbs in Kosovo are perhaps a little less alarmed by matters of concern than their 'brothers and sisters' in Serbia and the Serbia IDPs are most concerned of all.

Others

Again the priorities for the ‘others’ in both Kosovo and Serbia seem to reflect the views of the majority population in both places. However, Serbia others, perhaps as minorities in Serbia, give greater emphasis to the Kosovo government not offering sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs at 55% very significant.

Very Significant - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	64%	1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	62%
2	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	61%	2	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	62%
3	Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	57%	3	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	55%
4	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	55%	4	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	54%
5	Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	55%	5	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	52%

Some points of disagreement

If the ‘not even true’ responses to the questions are examined it is possible to find out what can best be called a ‘credibility gap’ is between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. For example the suggestion that Kosovo independence will result in more violence is not considered true by 88% of Kosovo Albanians while only about 1% of Serbs share this view. Similarly 65% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe the statement that the Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs while almost no Serbs at all share this sceptical opinion.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Kosovo independence will result in more violence	88%	1%	2%	0%
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	85%	2%	2%	1%
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	80%	3%	2%	2%
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	75%	3%	2%	1%
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	73%	16%	33%	23%
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	65%	0%	0%	1%
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	6%	50%	27%	41%
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	3%	41%	21%	13%
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	11%	38%	39%	51%
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	8%	34%	27%	19%
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	12%	26%	18%	9%

‘It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands’ is only considered not true by 6% of Kosovo Albanians while 50% of Kosovo Serbs do not believe this followed by 41% for Serb IDPs and 27% for Serbs living in Serbia. The credibility gap is not only between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs but also between Kosovo Serbs, Serbia Serbs and Serbia Serb IDPs. Interestingly keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war was number 2 on the Kosovo Albanian list at 43% very significant but 11% also believe this statement not to be true. Opinion on this issue seems to be some what split.

Some points of agreement

Conversely, when both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree with regards to the basic truth of a statement then a point of some agreement may have been achieved even if they do rate the issue at hand as being more or less significant. Everyone seems to believe, for example, that procedures for negotiations have not been decided and that there is a lack of a political role for Kosovo Serbs in negotiations. Providing Kosovo Serbs with such a role seems to be a problem that everyone would like to see resolved.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	2%	4%	2%	22%
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	0%	6%	2%	1%
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	3%	4%	1%	1%
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	2%	5%	6%	6%
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	7%	3%	2%	1%
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	5%	7%	10%	6%
International community distracted by Iraq	3%	15%	10%	7%
The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	17%	3%	1%	0%
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	15%	5%	8%	3%
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	19%	4%	2%	1%

Table 2.1. Question 2 – Kosovo Albanian

	Question 2 - Now with regards to Kosovo's Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	46%	29%	16%	5%	2%	2%
2	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	43%	32%	7%	4%	3%	11%
3	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	42%	41%	8%	1%	0%	7%
4	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	32%	26%	24%	8%	2%	8%
5	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	30%	28%	18%	16%	6%	3%
6	Lack of engagement by the international community	26%	24%	20%	5%	1%	24%
7	Belgrade holds Kosovo's status hostage	20%	31%	19%	10%	4%	16%
8	It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	20%	10%	14%	18%	32%	6%
9	Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	20%	13%	24%	21%	20%	2%
10	Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	20%	30%	16%	7%	8%	19%
11	The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the Serbian economy	16%	8%	19%	23%	15%	19%
12	International community distracted by Iraq	16%	25%	32%	17%	7%	3%
13	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	15%	25%	32%	10%	1%	17%
14	Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs	15%	14%	13%	20%	22%	16%
15	Resolving Kosovo's final status will bring instability to the region	14%	5%	1%	2%	7%	71%
16	Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community	14%	10%	28%	25%	4%	19%
17	The international community does not speak with one voice	11%	21%	21%	5%	6%	36%
18	Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	11%	9%	23%	15%	28%	14%
19	The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	11%	24%	22%	15%	14%	15%
20	No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	11%	15%	17%	18%	34%	5%
21	Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations	10%	22%	25%	21%	4%	17%
22	Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	9%	15%	20%	21%	23%	12%
23	Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	8%	31%	24%	24%	10%	3%
24	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	8%	4%	13%	9%	14%	51%
25	Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovo's debts	6%	10%	9%	17%	12%	46%
26	An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war	6%	5%	0%	1%	4%	84%
27	UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	5%	11%	13%	14%	18%	39%
28	Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued international presence	4%	16%	21%	14%	9%	36%
29	Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo	4%	6%	10%	21%	36%	23%
30	Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent Kosovo	4%	8%	10%	15%	34%	29%
31	If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional	4%	9%	15%	25%	19%	28%
32	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	3%	11%	11%	9%	7%	58%
33	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	3%	1%	3%	5%	13%	75%
34	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	3%	3%	4%	2%	8%	80%
35	An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia	3%	5%	11%	28%	25%	28%
36	Kosovo independence will result in more violence	2%	1%	2%	2%	5%	88%
37	The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems to Serbian society	2%	5%	13%	10%	14%	55%
38	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	2%	3%	15%	8%	8%	65%
39	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	1%	2%	1%	3%	8%	85%
40	Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	1%	3%	5%	6%	13%	73%
41	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	0%	0%	3%	11%	28%	58%
42	Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	0%	7%	45%	40%	7%	0%

Table 2.2. Question 2 – Kosovo Serb

	Question 2 - Now with regards to Kosovo's Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	80%	9%	4%	2%	3%	3%
2	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	79%	12%	2%	1%	0%	6%
3	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	79%	9%	6%	1%	4%	2%
4	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	79%	17%	1%	0%	0%	3%
5	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	78%	17%	3%	0%	2%	1%
6	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	77%	13%	4%	6%	0%	0%
7	UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	75%	17%	4%	1%	0%	2%
8	Kosovo independence will result in more violence	72%	20%	2%	1%	0%	5%
9	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	72%	17%	5%	2%	2%	2%
10	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	68%	23%	4%	1%	1%	3%
11	Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community	65%	15%	3%	6%	2%	8%
12	No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	63%	9%	7%	2%	12%	7%
13	Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	63%	21%	6%	3%	3%	4%
14	Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovo's debts	55%	25%	10%	5%	2%	2%
15	Resolving Kosovo's final status will bring instability to the region	55%	26%	9%	2%	1%	7%
16	An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war	55%	27%	10%	2%	3%	5%
17	If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional	54%	19%	6%	5%	5%	11%
18	The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	54%	24%	8%	2%	8%	5%
19	Belgrade holds Kosovo's status hostage	51%	17%	5%	9%	9%	8%
20	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	50%	32%	12%	2%	0%	3%
21	Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued international presence	44%	27%	12%	9%	2%	6%
22	Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo	44%	21%	11%	8%	4%	12%
23	The international community does not speak with one voice	43%	28%	10%	11%	2%	6%
24	Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	42%	30%	10%	11%	2%	4%
25	Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	41%	15%	12%	7%	10%	16%
26	Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	40%	32%	13%	1%	8%	6%
27	Lack of engagement by the international community	38%	29%	22%	3%	2%	6%
28	Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	37%	17%	13%	8%	20%	5%
29	An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia	37%	30%	11%	10%	6%	5%
30	Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent Kosovo	36%	22%	13%	9%	2%	19%
31	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	35%	41%	10%	10%	0%	4%
32	Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs	33%	17%	12%	7%	4%	26%
33	Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	31%	18%	13%	6%	17%	14%
34	Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations	29%	32%	15%	9%	5%	9%
35	International community distracted by Iraq	28%	22%	23%	7%	5%	15%
36	Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	27%	18%	22%	3%	4%	26%
37	The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the Serbian economy	27%	28%	12%	4%	11%	19%
38	The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems to Serbian society	18%	19%	13%	4%	8%	39%
39	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	18%	19%	19%	8%	3%	34%
40	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	16%	9%	7%	12%	15%	41%
41	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	15%	18%	9%	8%	12%	38%
42	It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	13%	9%	6%	15%	8%	50%

Table 2.3. Question 2 – Kosovo Others

	Question 2 - Now with regards to Kosovo's Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	64%	15%	21%	0%	0%	0%
2	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	61%	7%	10%	8%	0%	13%
3	Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	57%	0%	30%	0%	13%	0%
4	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	55%	13%	0%	32%	0%	0%
5	Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	55%	24%	6%	6%	6%	4%
6	Belgrade holds Kosovo's status hostage	53%	0%	17%	18%	8%	4%
7	The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	53%	16%	14%	6%	0%	11%
8	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	45%	20%	8%	17%	0%	10%
9	No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	40%	0%	19%	11%	29%	0%
10	Lack of engagement by the international community	38%	7%	41%	0%	0%	15%
11	Resolving Kosovo's final status will bring instability to the region	37%	6%	29%	0%	0%	28%
12	The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the Serbian economy	36%	0%	51%	13%	0%	0%
13	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	33%	8%	33%	15%	0%	12%
14	Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovo's debts	32%	0%	10%	24%	0%	34%
15	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	24%	0%	9%	8%	48%	12%
16	Kosovo independence will result in more violence	24%	9%	0%	6%	0%	62%
17	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	24%	0%	0%	0%	8%	69%
18	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	24%	0%	15%	16%	0%	46%
19	An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war	21%	11%	0%	0%	0%	68%
20	Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	20%	27%	33%	9%	6%	6%
21	Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	20%	0%	0%	10%	0%	70%
22	The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems to Serbian society	20%	17%	20%	9%	6%	28%
23	Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued international presence	18%	37%	12%	8%	0%	26%
24	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	17%	8%	7%	8%	32%	27%
25	Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community	17%	16%	51%	17%	0%	0%
26	International community distracted by Iraq	16%	6%	26%	32%	11%	10%
27	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	16%	70%	15%	0%	0%	0%
28	The international community does not speak with one voice	14%	15%	52%	8%	0%	11%
29	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	13%	16%	21%	0%	8%	43%
30	Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations	13%	0%	16%	43%	8%	21%
31	If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional	13%	8%	19%	24%	4%	32%
32	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	13%	0%	0%	8%	48%	31%
33	UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	13%	8%	17%	7%	41%	15%
34	Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	10%	57%	17%	16%	0%	0%
35	Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs	8%	6%	10%	14%	25%	37%
36	An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia	5%	36%	16%	21%	0%	22%
37	Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent Kosovo	0%	38%	0%	18%	41%	4%
38	Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo	0%	0%	27%	8%	41%	24%
39	Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	0%	8%	39%	22%	6%	25%
40	Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	0%	20%	63%	17%	0%	0%
41	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	0%	16%	28%	21%	9%	26%
42	It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	0%	0%	11%	13%	50%	26%

Table 2.4. Question 2 – Serbia Serb

	Question 2 – Now with regards to Kosovo’s Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	74%	17%	4%	1%	2%	2%
2	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	73%	18%	5%	1%	1%	2%
3	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	73%	21%	4%	0%	1%	1%
4	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	71%	22%	4%	1%	2%	0%
5	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	70%	19%	8%	1%	1%	2%
6	Kosovo independence will result in more violence	65%	21%	8%	1%	1%	4%
7	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	63%	26%	7%	1%	1%	1%
8	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	63%	22%	9%	2%	1%	2%
9	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	62%	28%	6%	1%	2%	1%
10	Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	58%	28%	11%	1%	1%	1%
11	UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	57%	29%	9%	3%	1%	1%
12	Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community	54%	27%	11%	4%	1%	3%
13	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	53%	32%	9%	2%	2%	2%
14	Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovo’s debts	53%	25%	13%	4%	3%	2%
15	No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	50%	15%	11%	8%	6%	10%
16	An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war	47%	23%	9%	3%	4%	13%
17	Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	46%	34%	12%	3%	2%	2%
18	Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo	46%	26%	14%	4%	2%	9%
19	The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the Serbian economy	44%	28%	18%	5%	2%	3%
20	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	42%	35%	13%	5%	2%	2%
21	Resolving Kosovo’s final status will bring instability to the region	42%	29%	10%	3%	2%	14%
22	Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	39%	36%	17%	5%	2%	2%
23	The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	36%	25%	14%	7%	9%	8%
24	Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations	36%	27%	19%	7%	3%	8%
25	The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems to Serbian society	35%	25%	18%	7%	5%	9%
26	Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	35%	24%	16%	5%	2%	18%
27	Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued international presence	33%	36%	18%	2%	2%	8%
28	The international community does not speak with one voice	33%	30%	18%	10%	5%	3%
29	Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	31%	19%	22%	10%	12%	6%
30	Lack of engagement by the international community	30%	29%	21%	9%	5%	6%
31	An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia	30%	27%	14%	9%	9%	12%
32	If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional	28%	24%	19%	11%	7%	11%
33	Belgrade holds Kosovo’s status hostage	28%	25%	19%	10%	8%	10%
34	It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	27%	16%	18%	6%	5%	27%
35	Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	26%	28%	20%	11%	10%	5%
36	Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs	24%	26%	18%	5%	5%	22%
37	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	22%	20%	21%	9%	7%	21%
38	Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent Kosovo	20%	15%	15%	9%	11%	30%
39	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	20%	18%	20%	9%	6%	27%
40	Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	20%	15%	16%	11%	5%	33%
41	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	19%	15%	15%	6%	7%	39%
42	International community distracted by Iraq	18%	20%	25%	13%	14%	10%

Table 2.5. Question 2 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 2 – Now with regards to Kosovo’s Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	93%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	88%	8%	2%	0%	0%	1%
3	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	83%	11%	4%	0%	1%	0%
4	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	81%	9%	5%	2%	0%	3%
5	UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	80%	17%	2%	1%	0%	0%
6	An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war	76%	12%	8%	0%	0%	5%
7	Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	74%	17%	6%	0%	2%	1%
8	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	73%	21%	4%	1%	0%	1%
9	Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community	72%	19%	3%	1%	0%	6%
10	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	72%	22%	4%	0%	0%	2%
11	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	69%	26%	3%	1%	0%	1%
12	Kosovo independence will result in more violence	68%	30%	1%	0%	0%	0%
13	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	67%	20%	10%	1%	0%	1%
14	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	64%	29%	6%	0%	0%	1%
15	Belgrade holds Kosovo’s status hostage	63%	4%	17%	2%	9%	5%
16	No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	61%	14%	8%	2%	8%	6%
17	If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional	60%	11%	7%	6%	12%	4%
18	Resolving Kosovo’s final status will bring instability to the region	58%	26%	5%	2%	1%	7%
19	Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	56%	10%	10%	6%	13%	6%
20	Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations	56%	19%	9%	4%	1%	11%
21	Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo	53%	19%	8%	11%	1%	7%
22	Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovo’s debts	52%	28%	7%	2%	1%	10%
23	Lack of engagement by the international community	51%	20%	14%	4%	5%	6%
24	The international community does not speak with one voice	50%	24%	15%	4%	4%	2%
25	The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	50%	23%	14%	3%	7%	3%
26	Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	48%	27%	22%	1%	2%	1%
27	Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	45%	6%	8%	8%	10%	23%
28	Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued international presence	45%	30%	18%	2%	3%	2%
29	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	43%	17%	7%	2%	9%	22%
30	An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia	42%	18%	17%	4%	9%	9%
31	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	41%	15%	22%	4%	5%	13%
32	The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the Serbian economy	41%	33%	4%	1%	7%	13%
33	Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	37%	23%	34%	3%	2%	1%
34	Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	34%	28%	24%	4%	1%	9%
35	Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	31%	25%	17%	1%	20%	7%
36	International community distracted by Iraq	30%	29%	11%	9%	13%	7%
37	Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent Kosovo	29%	10%	6%	4%	10%	40%
38	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	27%	14%	5%	2%	2%	51%
39	Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs	24%	24%	12%	1%	1%	38%
40	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	21%	25%	26%	5%	4%	19%
41	The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems to Serbian society	17%	26%	16%	3%	3%	36%
42	It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	13%	28%	12%	6%	1%	41%

Table 2.6. Question 2 – Serbia Others

	Question 2 – Now with regards to Kosovo’s Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	62%	22%	10%	2%	2%	3%
2	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	62%	25%	6%	4%	2%	2%
3	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	55%	30%	11%	1%	2%	1%
4	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	54%	23%	11%	5%	3%	5%
5	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	52%	27%	6%	6%	3%	6%
6	Kosovo independence will result in more violence	52%	23%	13%	3%	5%	4%
7	Resolving Kosovo’s final status will bring instability to the region	51%	22%	8%	4%	2%	12%
8	The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the Serbian economy	50%	28%	10%	5%	5%	2%
9	Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovo’s debts	47%	24%	9%	8%	7%	5%
10	Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	44%	40%	11%	0%	4%	1%
11	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	43%	35%	13%	7%	2%	0%
12	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	42%	35%	6%	3%	5%	9%
13	No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	42%	12%	12%	15%	5%	15%
14	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	42%	30%	10%	9%	3%	7%
15	Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community	42%	23%	17%	3%	4%	11%
16	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	40%	27%	16%	8%	5%	5%
17	An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war	39%	24%	9%	7%	2%	19%
18	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	39%	35%	10%	3%	6%	8%
19	Belgrade holds Kosovo’s status hostage	39%	18%	19%	11%	4%	9%
20	Lack of engagement by the international community	38%	32%	13%	9%	4%	4%
21	UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	38%	24%	25%	4%	5%	4%
22	Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	38%	24%	18%	6%	5%	9%
23	Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	37%	24%	15%	8%	10%	6%
24	The international community does not speak with one voice	37%	26%	23%	5%	3%	5%
25	The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	36%	19%	13%	15%	8%	9%
26	Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	35%	38%	22%	2%	1%	2%
27	The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems to Serbian society	34%	30%	10%	12%	1%	13%
28	Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	33%	37%	24%	3%	2%	1%
29	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	32%	18%	12%	4%	3%	31%
30	An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia	32%	15%	12%	15%	11%	16%
31	Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo	30%	30%	17%	10%	4%	9%
32	Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent Kosovo	29%	18%	18%	12%	5%	18%
33	If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional	28%	27%	13%	8%	8%	16%
34	Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued international presence	27%	41%	17%	4%	5%	5%
35	Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations	27%	36%	18%	6%	4%	9%
36	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	26%	26%	17%	10%	7%	14%
37	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	24%	20%	19%	7%	6%	25%
38	It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	22%	20%	24%	6%	6%	21%
39	Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	21%	28%	28%	13%	6%	5%
40	Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs	19%	31%	22%	6%	3%	18%
41	International community distracted by Iraq	18%	29%	27%	11%	6%	9%
42	Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	17%	17%	11%	16%	8%	30%

3. Serb and Albanian relations

The question

Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

Kosovo Albanian priorities

With regards to relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, from a list of 48 items (tables 3.1 to 3.6) the most significant problem for Kosovo Albanians is not knowing the fate of lost persons at 73% very significant followed by discrimination against Albanians in the 90s at 58%. Unfortunately 52% of Kosovo Serbs, 36% of Serbia Serbs and 44% of Serb IDPs do not even believe this discrimination to be true. Failure to prosecute war criminals comes in third at 41% very significant for Kosovo Albanians followed by the legacy of so many killings 4th at 38% and KLA officers in the police 5th at 37% very significant. As would be expected and noted below this policing issue is also a problem for Serbs.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	73%
2	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	58%
3	Failure to prosecute war criminals	41%
4	The legacy of so many killings	38%
5	KLA officers in the police	37%

Serbian priorities

For all Serbs, in Kosovo and Serbia, the most pressing problem is Albanians wanting a greater Albania at 75% very significant for Kosovo Serbs, 74% for Serbia Serbs and 79% for Serb IDPs. But 14% of Kosovo Albanians also think this is a very significant problem and 23% do not even think this is true. This issue gets visited again in the constitutional questions at the end of this report. KLA officers in the police is a matter of considerable concern for Kosovo Serbs at 74% very significant and 77% for Serb IDPs. But again 37% of Kosovo Albanians share this view. Perhaps something can be done about this.

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Albanians want a greater Albania	75%	1	Albanians want a greater Albania	74%	1	Albanians want a greater Albania	79%
2	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	75%	2	The legacy of so many killings	73%	2	KLA officers in the police	77%
3	KLA officers in the police	74%	3	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	69%	3	Apologies without security will not help	73%
4	KLA officers in government	71%	4	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	61%	4	Albanian provocations	72%
5	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	67%	5	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	59%	5	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	72%

Kosovo Albanians not being prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence comes in 5th at 67% for Kosovo Serbs, 3rd at 69% for Serbs in Serbia and 5th again at 72% for Serb IDPs. Unfortunately 51% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe this to be true. There is a serious credibility gap here that needs attention.

Others

Two interesting observations or priorities feature in the top five problems of the ‘others’. For Kosovo others, at number 2, they suggest that a lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians at 70% very significant. At 3rd on their list Serbia others have whole ethnic groups blamed for the crimes of a few at 57% very significant. Again, the views of others, although very similar to the majority perspective of the communities they live amongst, are a little different and this difference can sometimes be instructive or even refreshing.

Very Significant - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	77%	1	Albanians want a greater Albania	68%
2	Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	70%	2	The legacy of so many killings	67%
3	KLA officers in government	58%	3	Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	57%
4	Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	57%	4	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	55%
5	Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	57%	5	KLA officers in government	53%

Some points of disagreement

Eighty percent of Kosovo Albanians do not believe they are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade. Only 5% of Kosovo Serbs, 4% of Serbia Serbs and 2% of Serb IDPs share this view. Similarly 66% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe in an Albanian culture of violence and revenge and only between 3% and 6% of Serbs share this view. On the other hand 61% of Kosovo Serbs, 46% of Serbia Serbs and 51% of Serb IDPs do not believe in a Serb culture of violence and dominance. This time 15% of Kosovo Albanians agree with them, but most do not. However, beyond this particular credibility gap there are some grounds for hope. Both Kosovo Albanians (56%) and Serbs (between 37% and 42%) do not believe all the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	80%	5%	4%	2%
Albanian culture of violence and revenge	66%	3%	5%	6%
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	66%	42%	30%	49%
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	58%	2%	2%	0%
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	56%	42%	37%	40%
Serbs exaggerate the security problem	6%	68%	67%	74%
Serb culture of violence and dominance	15%	62%	46%	51%
Serb provocations	9%	61%	33%	59%
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	5%	59%	38%	40%
Serbs want a greater Serbia	2%	56%	52%	65%

In contrast to the point about a greater Albania made earlier it should be noted that 56% of Kosovo Serbs, 52% of Serbia Serbs and 65% of Serb IDPs do not believe Serbs want a greater Serbia. Unfortunately only 2% of Kosovo Albanians share this view so this particular credibility gap seems to be quite mutual.

Some points of agreement

There are some significant points of agreement to be taken from this analysis. Firstly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree that not knowing the fate of lost persons and the legacy of so many killings are significant problems. Almost no ones believes these problems are not true. Some what surprisingly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs also believe KLA officers in the police and government is also a problem. Hardly anyone thinks this is not true although, for example, while 71% of Kosovo Serbs think this problem is very significant only between 28% and 37% of Kosovo Albanians feel this strongly about this issue. But there is clearly sufficient common ground here to build on. There is also much agreement about the problems of inflammatory language in the media, the influence of war criminals in politics and a general lack of trust between Serbs and Albanians. But these problems are not unique to Kosovo and Serbia alone, the different ethnic groups and nationalities of Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia have to struggle with these same difficulties.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Not knowing the fate of lost persons	0%	0%	2%	0%
The legacy of so many killings	2%	0%	0%	0%
KLA officers in the police	3%	1%	1%	1%
KLA officers in government	1%	5%	1%	0%
Inflammatory language from politicians	5%	3%	2%	5%
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	3%	6%	1%	1%
Inflammatory language from the media	7%	4%	2%	5%
Influence of war criminals in politics	3%	8%	2%	1%
Failure to prosecute war criminals	1%	12%	4%	17%
Serb desire to return to pre-war status	5%	7%	5%	11%

Table 3.1. Question 3 - Kosovo Albanian

	Question 3 – Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	73%	21%	5%	1%	0%	0%
2	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	58%	32%	5%	1%	0%	4%
3	Failure to prosecute war criminals	41%	41%	13%	5%	1%	1%
4	The legacy of so many killings	38%	36%	21%	3%	0%	2%
5	KLA officers in the police	37%	27%	22%	7%	4%	3%
6	Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	37%	26%	16%	15%	1%	5%
7	Playing politics with bodies	36%	25%	15%	7%	2%	16%
8	Serb provocations	32%	24%	18%	9%	9%	9%
9	KLA officers in government	28%	34%	24%	11%	3%	1%
10	Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government	22%	30%	21%	11%	15%	1%
11	Inflammatory language from the media	21%	20%	30%	19%	3%	7%
12	Influence of war criminals in politics	20%	33%	28%	12%	4%	3%
13	Serbs exaggerate the security problem	19%	30%	20%	18%	7%	6%
14	Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	19%	13%	30%	25%	12%	1%
15	Inflammatory language from politicians	19%	23%	36%	11%	7%	5%
16	Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians	18%	20%	14%	22%	24%	1%
17	Serb culture of violence and dominance	17%	31%	19%	5%	13%	15%
18	Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	17%	36%	25%	16%	3%	3%
19	Inflammatory language from clerics	16%	21%	28%	18%	11%	6%
20	Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today	16%	18%	15%	17%	32%	2%
21	Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	15%	28%	23%	5%	1%	27%
22	Serbs want a greater Serbia	14%	6%	11%	15%	51%	2%
23	Albanians want a greater Albania	14%	28%	17%	15%	3%	23%
24	Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	13%	13%	8%	8%	5%	52%
25	Apologies without security will not help	12%	15%	22%	15%	15%	19%
26	Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public	12%	16%	27%	10%	7%	27%
27	Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms	11%	24%	30%	17%	15%	4%
28	Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	10%	25%	24%	16%	23%	2%
29	Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	9%	8%	7%	18%	51%	5%
30	Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	9%	6%	5%	12%	11%	57%
31	Albanian provocations	9%	12%	9%	5%	4%	61%
32	Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems	9%	19%	21%	12%	7%	32%
33	Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	8%	19%	18%	19%	21%	15%
34	Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies	8%	17%	21%	4%	4%	46%
35	Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo	8%	26%	23%	18%	23%	2%
36	Serb desire to return to pre-war status	8%	7%	6%	23%	50%	5%
37	Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks	8%	32%	30%	21%	6%	4%
38	Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	7%	9%	12%	3%	4%	66%
39	Albanians feel inferior to Serbs	7%	8%	14%	8%	20%	44%
40	Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	6%	7%	13%	23%	43%	8%
41	Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	5%	11%	29%	9%	4%	42%
42	Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	5%	2%	2%	4%	7%	80%
43	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	4%	8%	11%	12%	6%	58%
44	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	4%	15%	18%	10%	2%	51%
45	Albanian culture of violence and revenge	3%	7%	8%	7%	8%	66%
46	Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia	3%	5%	15%	12%	18%	46%
47	All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	3%	3%	14%	13%	11%	56%
48	Serbs feel inferior to Albanians	2%	6%	7%	15%	24%	46%

Table 3.2. Question 3 - Kosovo Serb

	Question 3 – Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Albanians want a greater Albania	75%	14%	4%	1%	6%	1%
2	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	75%	19%	2%	1%	2%	2%
3	KLA officers in the police	74%	18%	3%	3%	1%	1%
4	KLA officers in government	71%	16%	2%	3%	3%	5%
5	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	67%	18%	6%	2%	5%	2%
6	Albanian provocations	63%	22%	7%	4%	1%	4%
7	Apologies without security will not help	62%	27%	3%	2%	1%	4%
8	Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	59%	31%	6%	1%	1%	1%
9	The legacy of so many killings	58%	34%	3%	5%	0%	0%
10	Albanian culture of violence and revenge	54%	28%	9%	3%	3%	3%
11	Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	54%	23%	8%	3%	6%	5%
12	Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	51%	32%	5%	6%	0%	6%
13	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	51%	26%	11%	7%	6%	0%
14	Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	48%	31%	6%	3%	4%	7%
15	Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	45%	25%	13%	3%	3%	9%
16	Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo	43%	20%	11%	5%	7%	13%
17	Influence of war criminals in politics	39%	19%	13%	12%	10%	8%
18	Playing politics with bodies	38%	36%	21%	4%	1%	0%
19	Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia	38%	24%	9%	10%	11%	9%
20	Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies	37%	24%	16%	4%	6%	13%
21	Inflammatory language from the media	37%	33%	17%	9%	1%	4%
22	Serb desire to return to pre-war status	36%	30%	9%	10%	9%	7%
23	Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	29%	24%	16%	2%	10%	20%
24	Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks	27%	31%	12%	8%	4%	18%
25	Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	25%	11%	10%	17%	17%	20%
26	Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public	25%	40%	20%	1%	2%	12%
27	Inflammatory language from politicians	25%	39%	24%	9%	1%	3%
28	Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	24%	40%	15%	1%	3%	16%
29	Albanians feel inferior to Serbs	23%	11%	8%	6%	9%	43%
30	Failure to prosecute war criminals	22%	26%	20%	13%	7%	12%
31	Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	22%	28%	19%	2%	11%	17%
32	Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	22%	26%	20%	8%	12%	11%
33	Inflammatory language from clerics	17%	20%	15%	9%	18%	20%
34	Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today	15%	16%	18%	12%	12%	27%
35	Serbs feel inferior to Albanians	15%	20%	8%	4%	14%	40%
36	Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms	14%	21%	11%	8%	14%	32%
37	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	12%	6%	14%	7%	8%	52%
38	Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems	11%	13%	12%	6%	12%	46%
39	Serbs exaggerate the security problem	10%	9%	7%	5%	1%	68%
40	Serb provocations	10%	4%	3%	5%	18%	61%
41	Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	10%	18%	14%	8%	8%	42%
42	Serbs want a greater Serbia	9%	2%	5%	16%	12%	56%
43	Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	9%	19%	22%	10%	8%	33%
44	Serb culture of violence and dominance	6%	10%	2%	2%	17%	62%
45	Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians	6%	7%	5%	14%	18%	51%
46	Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	5%	3%	10%	7%	17%	59%
47	All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	4%	16%	16%	11%	10%	42%
48	Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government	3%	3%	7%	15%	18%	54%

Table 3.3. Question 3 – Kosovo Others

	Question 3 – Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	77%	19%	4%	0%	0%	0%
2	Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	70%	18%	8%	4%	0%	0%
3	KLA officers in government	58%	15%	28%	0%	0%	0%
4	Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	57%	13%	0%	8%	0%	22%
5	Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	57%	8%	11%	10%	13%	0%
6	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	57%	14%	6%	10%	0%	13%
7	KLA officers in the police	55%	25%	7%	13%	0%	0%
8	Serb provocations	55%	0%	32%	0%	0%	13%
9	Playing politics with bodies	53%	11%	17%	0%	0%	19%
10	Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today	49%	0%	26%	8%	17%	0%
11	Serbs want a greater Serbia	49%	0%	0%	4%	27%	20%
12	The legacy of so many killings	45%	41%	15%	0%	0%	0%
13	Failure to prosecute war criminals	45%	31%	16%	0%	8%	0%
14	Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	38%	16%	4%	32%	0%	10%
15	Serbs exaggerate the security problem	34%	22%	15%	0%	11%	18%
16	Influence of war criminals in politics	32%	30%	13%	25%	0%	0%
17	Serb desire to return to pre-war status	32%	21%	0%	28%	19%	0%
18	Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	32%	0%	0%	0%	8%	59%
19	Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	32%	0%	0%	25%	30%	13%
20	Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	32%	0%	0%	22%	17%	29%
21	Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	32%	7%	19%	4%	17%	21%
22	Serb culture of violence and dominance	32%	29%	0%	16%	0%	23%
23	Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public	30%	23%	41%	0%	0%	6%
24	Albanians want a greater Albania	30%	0%	12%	25%	20%	13%
25	Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	27%	15%	15%	5%	0%	38%
26	Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	26%	22%	19%	6%	13%	13%
27	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	24%	13%	16%	9%	10%	28%
28	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	19%	27%	16%	27%	0%	11%
29	Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	19%	0%	6%	0%	0%	75%
30	Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms	18%	0%	48%	10%	15%	9%
31	Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians	18%	26%	21%	16%	6%	13%
32	Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	17%	28%	40%	0%	9%	6%
33	Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems	16%	19%	16%	16%	0%	32%
34	Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies	15%	11%	34%	0%	19%	20%
35	Serbs feel inferior to Albanians	14%	6%	8%	31%	19%	22%
36	Apologies without security will not help	14%	18%	9%	55%	0%	4%
37	Inflammatory language from politicians	13%	6%	47%	20%	8%	6%
38	Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%	87%
39	Albanian culture of violence and revenge	13%	8%	17%	0%	16%	47%
40	Albanian provocations	13%	7%	33%	0%	0%	47%
41	Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government	10%	16%	25%	22%	15%	11%
42	Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo	8%	7%	32%	18%	21%	14%
43	Inflammatory language from the media	4%	21%	42%	18%	0%	15%
44	Albanians feel inferior to Serbs	0%	0%	33%	0%	4%	63%
45	Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks	0%	69%	12%	0%	0%	19%
46	Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia	0%	0%	9%	22%	22%	46%
47	All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	0%	0%	6%	18%	8%	68%
48	Inflammatory language from clerics	0%	12%	27%	23%	14%	24%

Table 3.4. Question 3 – Serbia Serb

	Question 3 – Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Albanians want a greater Albania	74%	15%	6%	2%	2%	0%
2	The legacy of so many killings	73%	20%	6%	1%	1%	0%
3	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	69%	21%	7%	2%	1%	1%
4	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	61%	18%	15%	3%	1%	2%
5	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	59%	28%	7%	3%	1%	2%
6	Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	59%	28%	8%	2%	1%	1%
7	Apologies without security will not help	58%	26%	9%	3%	2%	1%
8	KLA officers in government	58%	23%	11%	3%	5%	1%
9	KLA officers in the police	57%	26%	11%	3%	2%	1%
10	Influence of war criminals in politics	53%	27%	11%	4%	3%	2%
11	Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	51%	31%	12%	2%	1%	3%
12	Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	45%	25%	18%	6%	3%	3%
13	Albanian provocations	45%	28%	16%	4%	2%	5%
14	Inflammatory language from the media	45%	30%	15%	5%	3%	2%
15	Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks	44%	36%	12%	2%	2%	4%
16	Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	44%	25%	16%	4%	5%	6%
17	Inflammatory language from politicians	44%	32%	14%	5%	4%	2%
18	Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	43%	30%	13%	6%	4%	4%
19	Serbs feel inferior to Albanians	41%	19%	15%	5%	3%	18%
20	Albanian culture of violence and revenge	39%	33%	14%	5%	5%	5%
21	Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	37%	31%	16%	3%	4%	9%
22	Failure to prosecute war criminals	37%	27%	17%	6%	9%	4%
23	Playing politics with bodies	36%	32%	23%	5%	3%	1%
24	Serb desire to return to pre-war status	35%	29%	16%	7%	9%	5%
25	Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public	35%	34%	21%	3%	3%	5%
26	Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	34%	24%	17%	7%	5%	12%
27	Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	31%	27%	17%	9%	4%	12%
28	Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies	31%	19%	24%	11%	7%	8%
29	Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo	29%	28%	21%	7%	9%	7%
30	Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	28%	24%	20%	7%	6%	15%
31	Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia	26%	19%	19%	12%	10%	15%
32	Inflammatory language from clerics	24%	20%	19%	7%	10%	19%
33	Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today	24%	26%	23%	8%	5%	14%
34	Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems	23%	19%	12%	6%	6%	34%
35	Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	17%	13%	19%	12%	18%	21%
36	Albanians feel inferior to Serbs	17%	10%	11%	8%	13%	42%
37	Serb provocations	17%	14%	16%	7%	13%	33%
38	All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	17%	14%	19%	6%	7%	37%
39	Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	15%	17%	15%	11%	12%	30%
40	Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	14%	25%	28%	11%	9%	12%
41	Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms	13%	23%	16%	9%	8%	31%
42	Serb culture of violence and dominance	12%	11%	11%	8%	11%	46%
43	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	11%	16%	14%	10%	14%	36%
44	Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	10%	11%	18%	10%	12%	38%
45	Serbs want a greater Serbia	9%	5%	10%	9%	14%	52%
46	Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians	7%	13%	18%	12%	18%	32%
47	Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government	6%	12%	15%	9%	10%	48%
48	Serbs exaggerate the security problem	6%	5%	11%	5%	5%	67%

Table 3.5. Question 3 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 3 – Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Albanians want a greater Albania	79%	8%	9%	2%	2%	0%
2	KLA officers in the police	77%	11%	7%	2%	1%	1%
3	Apologies without security will not help	73%	13%	7%	1%	3%	3%
4	Albanian provocations	72%	18%	6%	0%	0%	3%
5	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	72%	21%	6%	1%	0%	1%
6	The legacy of so many killings	70%	27%	3%	0%	0%	0%
7	Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	64%	29%	5%	2%	0%	1%
8	Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	60%	21%	11%	1%	4%	2%
9	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	59%	22%	14%	2%	2%	0%
10	Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	57%	28%	12%	0%	0%	2%
11	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	56%	29%	14%	1%	0%	0%
12	Playing politics with bodies	54%	20%	22%	3%	1%	0%
13	Serb desire to return to pre-war status	54%	8%	7%	3%	17%	11%
14	Inflammatory language from politicians	54%	15%	12%	11%	3%	5%
15	Influence of war criminals in politics	53%	24%	8%	3%	10%	1%
16	Albanian culture of violence and revenge	52%	13%	12%	11%	6%	6%
17	Inflammatory language from the media	52%	16%	14%	12%	2%	5%
18	KLA officers in government	49%	31%	8%	2%	11%	0%
19	Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	48%	15%	8%	5%	2%	23%
20	Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	45%	21%	17%	1%	4%	12%
21	Albanians feel inferior to Serbs	42%	4%	5%	3%	6%	39%
22	Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies	37%	15%	21%	8%	6%	13%
23	Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks	34%	24%	16%	3%	6%	17%
24	Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	33%	28%	12%	8%	4%	15%
25	Serbs feel inferior to Albanians	32%	31%	13%	1%	3%	20%
26	Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia	30%	30%	17%	1%	17%	5%
27	Failure to prosecute war criminals	29%	20%	23%	5%	6%	17%
28	Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	29%	19%	30%	5%	6%	10%
29	Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public	27%	22%	31%	4%	5%	12%
30	Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo	27%	28%	10%	8%	11%	16%
31	Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today	25%	18%	16%	6%	7%	28%
32	Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	23%	22%	21%	9%	2%	22%
33	Serb provocations	21%	5%	4%	2%	10%	59%
34	Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	20%	18%	17%	6%	10%	28%
35	Serb culture of violence and dominance	18%	7%	8%	2%	14%	51%
36	Inflammatory language from clerics	18%	13%	12%	22%	8%	26%
37	Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems	16%	16%	9%	6%	1%	52%
38	Serbs want a greater Serbia	16%	3%	4%	6%	7%	65%
39	Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	15%	10%	12%	5%	9%	49%
40	Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government	12%	11%	9%	2%	6%	59%
41	Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	10%	24%	17%	7%	6%	36%
42	Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	10%	9%	16%	20%	10%	36%
43	Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	9%	8%	18%	6%	19%	40%
44	All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	7%	20%	17%	8%	8%	40%
45	Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms	7%	18%	16%	7%	3%	48%
46	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	5%	8%	23%	6%	14%	44%
47	Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians	4%	7%	18%	5%	10%	55%
48	Serbs exaggerate the security problem	3%	5%	4%	9%	5%	74%

Table 3.6. Question 3 – Serbia Others

	Question 3 – Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Albanians want a greater Albania	68%	14%	11%	4%	2%	1%
2	The legacy of so many killings	67%	24%	6%	1%	0%	2%
3	Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	57%	30%	4%	6%	0%	3%
4	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	55%	29%	10%	4%	1%	0%
5	KLA officers in government	53%	23%	6%	10%	8%	0%
6	Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	52%	28%	12%	4%	0%	3%
7	Apologies without security will not help	51%	32%	9%	3%	3%	2%
8	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	50%	27%	11%	3%	3%	6%
9	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	48%	34%	7%	7%	1%	2%
10	Inflammatory language from politicians	47%	30%	11%	4%	4%	3%
11	Inflammatory language from the media	47%	27%	10%	5%	5%	6%
12	Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	45%	22%	19%	4%	2%	8%
13	KLA officers in the police	42%	36%	10%	5%	2%	4%
14	Playing politics with bodies	41%	37%	17%	1%	2%	2%
15	Influence of war criminals in politics	41%	32%	14%	4%	3%	6%
16	Albanian provocations	40%	36%	13%	3%	3%	5%
17	Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks	40%	31%	19%	3%	1%	6%
18	Albanian culture of violence and revenge	40%	32%	15%	6%	2%	5%
19	Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today	38%	32%	12%	3%	3%	11%
20	Serb desire to return to pre-war status	37%	37%	6%	10%	3%	7%
21	Failure to prosecute war criminals	34%	37%	17%	40%	3%	5%
22	Serbs feel inferior to Albanians	29%	25%	19%	8%	3%	15%
23	Inflammatory language from clerics	28%	26%	9%	12%	10%	16%
24	Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems	27%	20%	11%	7%	5%	30%
25	Serb provocations	26%	31%	13%	7%	2%	20%
26	Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public	24%	32%	15%	9%	5%	15%
27	Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	24%	31%	28%	6%	3%	8%
28	Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms	24%	22%	8%	9%	8%	28%
29	Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	23%	39%	22%	5%	1%	9%
30	Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	23%	45%	18%	7%	1%	6%
31	Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia	22%	24%	16%	10%	8%	20%
32	Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	22%	38%	18%	11%	4%	7%
33	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	20%	18%	23%	12%	6%	22%
34	Serb culture of violence and dominance	19%	29%	13%	8%	4%	27%
35	Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government	18%	17%	13%	10%	5%	36%
36	Serbs want a greater Serbia	18%	28%	11%	9%	3%	30%
37	Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	18%	40%	16%	3%	4%	18%
38	Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo	18%	45%	14%	9%	7%	7%
39	Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	17%	38%	27%	5%	5%	8%
40	Albanians feel inferior to Serbs	17%	27%	13%	10%	4%	29%
41	All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	15%	20%	25%	7%	7%	25%
42	Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	15%	37%	19%	18%	4%	7%
43	Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	15%	29%	19%	13%	7%	18%
44	Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies	14%	22%	18%	23%	9%	14%
45	Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	13%	16%	15%	11%	6%	38%
46	Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	13%	37%	21%	10%	8%	12%
47	Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians	11%	22%	12%	7%	13%	34%
48	Serbs exaggerate the security problem	10%	16%	10%	6%	2%	54%

4. Security

The question

Now with regards to security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

Kosovo Albanian priorities

The security list of problems contains 29 items (see tables 4.1 to 4.6). The weak justice system comes in at the top of the Kosovo Albanian list at 49% very significant. This is followed by organised political crime at 48%, Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica and a lack of trust in the justice system both at 46% and then 5th, at 43% very significant, slow working of the justice system. Seventy nine percent of Serb IDPs share this concern. However 89% of Kosovo Serbs also consider Serbs being afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina to be very significant. Fear, in these regards, seems to be quite mutual.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Weak justice system	49%
2	Organised political crime	48%
3	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	46%
4	Lack of trust in the justice system	46%
5	Slow working of the justice system	43%

Serbian priorities

The most important security concern for Serbs is that people do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo at 84% very significant for Kosovo Serbs, 91% for Serbia Serbs and 94% for Serb IDPs. This is followed by isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes for Kosovo Serbs at 72%, Serbia Serbs 83% and Serb IDPs 76%. After this comes no unconditional support from the Albanian political leadership to improve security at 66% for Kosovo Serbs, 71% for Serbia Serbs and 82% for Serb IDPs. Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) comes in 5th on the Kosovo Serb (65%) and Serbia Serb (71%) lists but, perhaps understandably Serb IDPs put UNMIK do not provide effective security in their top five concerns at 82% very significant.

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	89%	1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	91%	1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	94%
2	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	84%	2	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	83%	2	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	82%
3	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	72%	3	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	71%	3	Organised political crime	82%
4	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	66%	4	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	71%	4	UNMIK do not provide effective security	82%
5	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	65%	5	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	71%	5	Slow working of the justice system	79%

Others

Like Serbs and Kosovo Albanians ‘others’ are also concerned about the slow working of the justice system at 85% very significant for Kosovo others and 60% for Serbia others. However the top priorities for the Kosovo others then depart a little from that of their Albanian fellow citizens with security forces not accountable to the people at 70% very significant followed by corruption in UNMIK at 66%, organised political crime at 64% and then 5th, UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals, at 44% very significant.

Very Significant - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Slow working of the justice system	85%	1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	75%
2	Security forces are not accountable to the people	70%	2	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	68%
3	Corruption in UNMIK	66%	3	Organised political crime	63%
4	Organised political crime	64%	4	Lack of trust in the justice system	63%
5	UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	44%	5	Slow working of the justice system	60%

Some points of disagreement

For Serbs the problem of security is their biggest problem. It is therefore a matter of some concern that Kosovo Albanians do not seem to believe how seriously Serbs take this issue. Sixty nine percent of Kosovo Albanians do not consider the proposition that people do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo to be true. They also do not believe the Kosovo Albanian political leadership are failing to give unconditional support to the improvement of security (67% not even true) and that isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes (65% not even true). But then, somewhat similarly, 60% of Kosovo Serbs (45% Serbia Serbs and 51% Serb IDPs) do not believe Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads. Only 13% of Kosovo Albanians would agree. And then again 60% of Kosovo Serbs (55% Serbia Serbs and 51% Serb IDPs) do not believe Albanians fear an external military threat. This time only 22% of Kosovo Albanians would agree. Finally, in this list there is also the Pristina/Mitrovica credibility gap mentioned earlier where neither group believe the other when they say they are afraid to speak their own language in the others ‘territory’.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	69%	0%	0%	1%
Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	68%	0%	2%	0%
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	67%	3%	0%	1%
Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	65%	7%	0%	0%
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	65%	5%	3%	3%
Not enough minorities in government posts	20%	1%	1%	0%
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	13%	60%	45%	51%
Albanian fear from external military threat	22%	60%	55%	51%
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	4%	45%	20%	31%
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	4%	44%	38%	50%
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	4%	13%	2%	6%

With regards to clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo the results for both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are mixed. Some think this is a problem and some do not, while a few do not believe it to be true. So this item ended up in both this list and the one below.

Some points of agreement

With regards to the weak justice system, slow working of the justice system and lack of trust in the justice system everyone seems to think there is plenty of room for improvement and very few people, from both communities, do not consider these problems to be true. Organised political crime is also a common problem for everyone as well as a lack of local police whose ethnic composition reflects the local populations. Even 43% of Kosovo Albanians believe the problem of Kosovo Serbs not being able to trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to be very significant or significant. Clearly movement can be made on all these issues with a minimum of political leadership.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Weak justice system	2%	0%	1%	0%
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	4%	3%	1%	4%
Slow working of the justice system	5%	2%	0%	1%
Lack of trust in the justice system	2%	5%	0%	0%
Organised political crime	2%	5%	0%	1%
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	9%	7%	1%	1%
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	4%	13%	2%	6%
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	10%	12%	1%	1%
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	16%	9%	6%	3%

Most Serbs and Kosovo Albanians agree that they have opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) but this can hardly be counted as real progress. However, there does seem to be general support for the prosecution of war criminals from both communities.

Table 4.1. Question 4 – Kosovo Albanian

	Question 4 - Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Weak justice system	49%	32%	14%	2%	1%	2%
2	Organised political crime	48%	29%	15%	6%	1%	2%
3	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	46%	25%	20%	5%	0%	4%
4	Lack of trust in the justice system	46%	29%	18%	5%	0%	2%
5	Slow working of the justice system	43%	35%	12%	5%	1%	5%
6	Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	42%	26%	11%	4%	1%	16%
7	War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	35%	37%	14%	5%	4%	4%
8	Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	33%	27%	12%	7%	7%	13%
9	UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	31%	23%	9%	4%	3%	30%
10	Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	30%	27%	16%	6%	11%	10%
11	Corruption in UNMIK	29%	21%	8%	4%	10%	28%
12	Albanian fear from external military threat	21%	21%	16%	13%	7%	22%
13	No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	21%	24%	29%	19%	4%	4%
14	Security forces are not accountable to the people	19%	28%	15%	6%	1%	31%
15	Lack of coordination in KFOR	16%	24%	16%	7%	3%	35%
16	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	16%	27%	15%	15%	16%	9%
17	The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures	15%	16%	19%	12%	3%	36%
18	Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	14%	31%	29%	20%	2%	4%
19	UNMIK do not provide effective security	14%	21%	16%	5%	10%	34%
20	4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and Opposition/Shadow	14%	16%	24%	20%	8%	18%
21	The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security	13%	12%	14%	3%	5%	53%
22	KFOR are not trained for policing duties	12%	20%	10%	7%	3%	49%
23	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	10%	8%	5%	3%	5%	69%
24	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	10%	11%	5%	3%	3%	67%
25	Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear	7%	17%	22%	15%	3%	36%
26	Not enough minorities in government posts	6%	8%	21%	28%	16%	20%
27	Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	4%	8%	9%	6%	9%	65%
28	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	3%	5%	9%	7%	11%	65%
29	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	1%	11%	7%	7%	6%	68%

Table 4.2. Question 4 – Kosovo Serb

	Question 4 - Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	89%	11%	0%	1%	0%	0%
2	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	84%	16%	0%	0%	1%	0%
3	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	72%	17%	4%	0%	0%	7%
4	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	66%	22%	2%	1%	6%	3%
5	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	65%	18%	7%	1%	1%	7%
6	Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	59%	27%	5%	3%	1%	5%
7	UNMIK do not provide effective security	59%	31%	5%	0%	2%	3%
8	The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security	59%	23%	10%	1%	1%	6%
9	Security forces are not accountable to the people	56%	25%	11%	4%	1%	3%
10	Organised political crime	54%	29%	3%	6%	1%	5%
11	Not enough minorities in government posts	54%	30%	9%	1%	5%	1%
12	UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	53%	33%	5%	3%	1%	5%
13	Slow working of the justice system	47%	38%	8%	1%	4%	2%
14	Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	46%	23%	8%	5%	7%	12%
15	Corruption in UNMIK	43%	30%	15%	6%	4%	2%
16	Weak justice system	43%	36%	11%	5%	5%	0%
17	No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	42%	37%	12%	4%	2%	3%
18	KFOR are not trained for policing duties	41%	36%	11%	3%	7%	3%
19	Lack of trust in the justice system	40%	40%	12%	1%	2%	5%
20	The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures	37%	40%	12%	4%	6%	1%
21	Lack of coordination in KFOR	33%	32%	17%	7%	3%	8%
22	Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear	29%	44%	20%	4%	2%	0%
23	Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	27%	24%	12%	14%	13%	9%
24	Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	22%	30%	18%	12%	5%	13%
25	4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and Opposition/Shadow	21%	30%	19%	12%	9%	9%
26	War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	11%	12%	10%	6%	16%	45%
27	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	7%	8%	12%	11%	18%	44%
28	Albanian fear from external military threat	7%	6%	6%	10%	12%	60%
29	Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	3%	6%	3%	6%	22%	60%

Table 4.3. Question 4 – Kosovo Others

	Question 4 - Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	Slow working of the justice system	85%	0%	0%	10%	0%	4%
2	Security forces are not accountable to the people	70%	0%	0%	0%	0%	30%
3	Corruption in UNMIK	66%	20%	0%	0%	0%	15%
4	Organised political crime	64%	0%	0%	36%	0%	0%
5	UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	44%	37%	9%	5%	0%	6%
6	Not enough minorities in government posts	43%	13%	41%	0%	0%	4%
7	KFOR are not trained for policing duties	42%	15%	10%	0%	20%	11%
8	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	40%	0%	0%	0%	0%	60%
9	Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	38%	36%	14%	6%	0%	6%
10	Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	32%	16%	8%	10%	0%	33%
11	Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	32%	13%	23%	25%	7%	0%
12	Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	32%	32%	32%	0%	0%	4%
13	UNMIK do not provide effective security	32%	30%	24%	0%	0%	15%
14	Lack of coordination in KFOR	32%	20%	25%	0%	19%	4%
15	War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	32%	24%	0%	27%	4%	13%
16	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	27%	34%	20%	0%	0%	19%
17	The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security	24%	6%	28%	0%	6%	36%
18	Lack of trust in the justice system	23%	21%	47%	9%	0%	0%
19	No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	21%	11%	36%	6%	25%	0%
20	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	20%	8%	32%	0%	0%	40%
21	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	18%	13%	0%	9%	0%	60%
22	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	18%	29%	33%	6%	15%	0%
23	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	13%	0%	32%	0%	4%	51%
24	4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and Opposition/Shadow	13%	10%	16%	61%	0%	0%
25	Weak justice system	11%	37%	52%	0%	0%	0%
26	The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures	10%	25%	27%	24%	0%	15%
27	Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear	9%	32%	28%	10%	0%	22%
28	Albanian fear from external military threat	8%	12%	0%	21%	6%	54%
29	Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	0%	13%	32%	7%	8%	40%

Table 4.4. Question 4 – Serbia Serb

	Question 4 – Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	91%	8%	1%	0%	1%	0%
2	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	83%	15%	2%	0%	0%	0%
3	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	71%	25%	3%	0%	1%	0%
4	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	71%	21%	6%	0%	1%	2%
5	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	71%	23%	4%	0%	0%	1%
6	UNMIK do not provide effective security	67%	23%	7%	3%	0%	0%
7	Organised political crime	66%	24%	6%	2%	2%	0%
8	Weak justice system	66%	24%	7%	1%	0%	1%
9	UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	66%	23%	8%	2%	1%	0%
10	Lack of trust in the justice system	65%	26%	8%	2%	0%	0%
11	Slow working of the justice system	62%	25%	8%	3%	1%	0%
12	Corruption in UNMIK	60%	26%	8%	3%	2%	1%
13	Security forces are not accountable to the people	58%	29%	8%	2%	1%	2%
14	Not enough minorities in government posts	56%	26%	12%	3%	1%	1%
15	No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	52%	28%	14%	3%	2%	1%
16	The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security	51%	27%	12%	2%	2%	7%
17	Lack of coordination in KFOR	50%	28%	13%	4%	3%	1%
18	The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures	46%	26%	16%	5%	3%	3%
19	Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	45%	32%	15%	5%	2%	2%
20	KFOR are not trained for policing duties	41%	22%	21%	6%	3%	8%
21	Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear	40%	29%	21%	7%	1%	3%
22	Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	38%	28%	19%	9%	4%	2%
23	Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	38%	23%	19%	7%	6%	6%
24	4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and Opposition/Shadow	34%	28%	22%	9%	3%	4%
25	Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	33%	32%	21%	9%	4%	1%
26	War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	14%	19%	17%	13%	17%	20%
27	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	14%	15%	14%	7%	13%	38%
28	Albanian fear from external military threat	7%	7%	11%	8%	12%	55%
29	Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	6%	8%	12%	11%	19%	45%

Table 4.5. Question 4 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 4 – Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	94%	4%	1%	0%	0%	1%
2	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	82%	13%	3%	1%	0%	1%
3	Organised political crime	82%	15%	1%	1%	0%	1%
4	UNMIK do not provide effective security	82%	14%	3%	1%	0%	0%
5	Slow working of the justice system	79%	18%	2%	0%	0%	1%
6	Corruption in UNMIK	79%	10%	6%	0%	2%	4%
7	Lack of coordination in KFOR	77%	17%	5%	0%	0%	1%
8	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	76%	19%	5%	1%	0%	0%
9	Security forces are not accountable to the people	75%	18%	4%	2%	0%	1%
10	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	75%	14%	4%	6%	1%	0%
11	UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	71%	19%	6%	3%	0%	0%
12	Not enough minorities in government posts	70%	19%	8%	1%	2%	0%
13	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	70%	17%	9%	2%	1%	1%
14	Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	64%	24%	6%	3%	0%	3%
15	Lack of trust in the justice system	63%	19%	13%	4%	1%	0%
16	KFOR are not trained for policing duties	63%	22%	12%	0%	2%	1%
17	Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	56%	18%	18%	4%	3%	1%
18	No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	55%	28%	9%	2%	1%	4%
19	4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and Opposition/Shadow	54%	25%	9%	5%	5%	2%
20	The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security	50%	33%	12%	1%	2%	3%
21	Weak justice system	48%	34%	11%	7%	1%	0%
22	The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures	47%	26%	22%	0%	1%	4%
23	Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	45%	25%	13%	4%	8%	6%
24	Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear	41%	21%	34%	3%	1%	1%
25	Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	41%	24%	17%	6%	9%	3%
26	War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	20%	4%	9%	22%	15%	31%
27	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	13%	9%	12%	4%	12%	50%
28	Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	4%	7%	18%	10%	10%	51%
29	Albanian fear from external military threat	4%	10%	11%	11%	13%	51%

Table 4.6. Question 4 – Serbia Others

	Question 4 – Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	75%	19%	3%	0%	0%	3%
2	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	68%	18%	8%	2%	1%	2%
3	Organised political crime	63%	31%	3%	1%	0%	2%
4	Lack of trust in the justice system	63%	24%	8%	2%	1%	2%
5	Slow working of the justice system	60%	31%	5%	2%	0%	2%
6	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	60%	29%	8%	1%	2%	0%
7	UNMIK do not provide effective security	55%	25%	11%	2%	0%	8%
8	Weak justice system	54%	34%	8%	2%	2%	0%
9	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	51%	30%	13%	2%	2%	2%
10	No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	49%	33%	11%	4%	4%	0%
11	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	48%	30%	7%	4%	4%	6%
12	UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	47%	34%	10%	4%	3%	2%
13	Corruption in UNMIK	44%	25%	8%	13%	3%	8%
14	Not enough minorities in government posts	43%	36%	14%	4%	0%	3%
15	4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and Opposition/Shadow	39%	22%	25%	7%	1%	7%
16	Security forces are not accountable to the people	39%	35%	14%	9%	1%	2%
17	Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	38%	38%	11%	9%	3%	1%
18	Lack of coordination in KFOR	37%	29%	15%	9%	4%	7%
19	Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	36%	42%	14%	4%	1%	3%
20	Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear	36%	31%	19%	3%	4%	7%
21	The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security	36%	31%	19%	5%	5%	3%
22	The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures	34%	32%	12%	12%	5%	4%
23	Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	33%	42%	13%	8%	0%	3%
24	Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	32%	39%	19%	6%	1%	4%
25	KFOR are not trained for policing duties	30%	29%	18%	12%	4%	7%
26	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	22%	14%	14%	10%	9%	31%
27	War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	17%	33%	13%	19%	5%	14%
28	Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	13%	20%	21%	17%	6%	23%
29	Albanian fear from external military threat	7%	10%	14%	11%	19%	39%

5. A future without agreement

The question

And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be ‘Very probable’, ‘Probable’, ‘Not sure’ about, ‘Improbable’ or ‘Very improbable’.

Kosovo Albanian possible futures

Relatively speaking Kosovo Albanians are not nearly so worried about the future as Kosovo Serbs, Serbia Serbs and Serbia IDPs. If the problems reviewed in questions 1 to 4 do not get properly addressed then only 31% of Kosovo Albanians believe this will very probably lead to social unrest and only 17% believe this will very probably lead to the isolation of Kosovo and Serbia.

Very Probable - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Social unrest	31%
2	Increased criminalisation	29%
3	Lack of investment	28%
4	Increased emigration	28%
5	Renewed violent conflict	26%
6	Decrease in international assistance	24%
7	Increased international military presence	24%
8	Escalation of ethnic tensions	20%
9	Increased political instability	19%
10	Increased regional instability	18%
11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	17%

Serbian possible futures

All the groups of Serbs interviewed for this poll believed the most likely outcome of not adequately dealing with these problems will very probably lead to increased criminalisation at 55% for Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 70% for Serb IDPs. However, like their Albanian counterparts, they also believe the least likely outcome of such a failure would be the isolation of Kosovo and Serbia. Clearly very few people in Kosovo or Serbia believe the international community is about to ‘turn their back’ on them, whatever happens.

Very Probable - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Increased criminalisation	55%	1	Increased criminalisation	65%	1	Increased criminalisation	70%
2	Increased emigration	47%	2	Increased political instability	57%	2	Renewed violent conflict	62%
3	Increased regional instability	47%	3	Escalation of ethnic tensions	54%	3	Increased political instability	61%
4	Increased political instability	42%	4	Social unrest	53%	4	Escalation of ethnic tensions	59%
5	Renewed violent conflict	41%	5	Increased emigration	51%	5	Social unrest	56%
6	Escalation of ethnic tensions	40%	6	Increased regional instability	51%	6	Increased regional instability	51%
7	Decrease in international assistance	34%	7	Renewed violent conflict	51%	7	Increased emigration	49%
8	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	33%	8	Lack of investment	41%	8	Increased international military presence	47%
9	Lack of investment	32%	9	Increased international military presence	41%	9	Decrease in international assistance	45%
10	Social unrest	30%	10	Decrease in international assistance	39%	10	Lack of investment	40%
11	Increased international military presence	28%	11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	32%	11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	30%

Others

Like the majority population in which they live Kosovo others are far less concerned about the future than their Serbia other counterparts. Increased emigration comes in at the top of the Kosovo others list at 27% very probable while increased criminalisation comes in on the top of the Serbia others list at 57% very probable.

Very Probable - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Increased emigration	27%	1	Increased criminalisation	57%
2	Renewed violent conflict	26%	2	Increased political instability	57%
3	Increased regional instability	23%	3	Escalation of ethnic tensions	52%
4	Increased international military presence	22%	4	Social unrest	51%
5	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	20%	5	Increased regional instability	46%
6	Increased political instability	20%	6	Increased emigration	45%
7	Increased criminalisation	18%	7	Lack of investment	39%
8	Social unrest	18%	8	Increased international military presence	39%
9	Decrease in international assistance	17%	9	Renewed violent conflict	39%
10	Lack of investment	17%	10	Decrease in international assistance	35%
11	Escalation of ethnic tensions	15%	11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	31%

Table 5.1. Question 5 – Kosovo Albanians

	Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Not sure' about, 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.	Very probable	Probable	Not sure	Improbable	Very improbable
1	Social unrest	31%	41%	26%	2%	1%
2	Increased criminalisation	29%	47%	21%	2%	1%
3	Lack of investment	28%	54%	16%	2%	0%
4	Increased emigration	28%	51%	19%	2%	0%
5	Renewed violent conflict	26%	36%	29%	7%	2%
6	Decrease in international assistance	24%	55%	19%	2%	1%
7	Increased international military presence	24%	44%	27%	3%	1%
8	Escalation of ethnic tensions	20%	43%	32%	3%	1%
9	Increased political instability	19%	51%	27%	3%	1%
10	Increased regional instability	18%	49%	29%	4%	1%
11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	17%	28%	23%	12%	20%

Table 5.2. Question 5 – Kosovo Serb

	Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Not sure' about, 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.	Very probable	Probable	Not sure	Improbable	Very improbable
1	Increased criminalisation	55%	40%	4%	1%	0%
2	Increased emigration	47%	46%	6%	1%	0%
3	Increased regional instability	47%	38%	9%	4%	1%
4	Increased political instability	42%	42%	12%	2%	2%
5	Renewed violent conflict	41%	49%	8%	1%	1%
6	Escalation of ethnic tensions	40%	46%	11%	2%	2%
7	Decrease in international assistance	34%	51%	11%	2%	1%
8	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	33%	40%	19%	3%	5%
9	Lack of investment	32%	52%	12%	3%	1%
10	Social unrest	30%	55%	8%	6%	1%
11	Increased international military presence	28%	47%	13%	5%	7%

Table 5.3. Question 5 – Kosovo Others

	Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Not sure' about, 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.	Very probable	Probable	Not sure	Improbable	Very improbable
1	Increased emigration	27%	54%	19%	0%	0%
2	Renewed violent conflict	26%	34%	34%	6%	0%
3	Increased regional instability	23%	40%	31%	6%	0%
4	Increased international military presence	22%	26%	39%	0%	13%
5	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	20%	33%	23%	6%	17%
6	Increased political instability	20%	45%	28%	7%	0%
7	Increased criminalisation	18%	32%	50%	0%	0%
8	Social unrest	18%	47%	35%	0%	0%
9	Decrease in international assistance	17%	68%	15%	0%	0%
10	Lack of investment	17%	78%	5%	0%	0%
11	Escalation of ethnic tensions	15%	44%	36%	5%	0%

Table 5.4. Question 5 – Serbia Serb

	Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Not sure' about, 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.	Very probable	Probable	Not sure	Improbable	Very improbable
1	Increased criminalisation	65%	29%	6%	0%	0%
2	Increased political instability	57%	37%	6%	1%	0%
3	Escalation of ethnic tensions	54%	36%	10%	1%	0%
4	Social unrest	53%	34%	10%	2%	1%
5	Increased emigration	51%	36%	11%	1%	0%
6	Increased regional instability	51%	35%	12%	2%	1%
7	Renewed violent conflict	51%	34%	12%	2%	1%
8	Lack of investment	41%	43%	12%	3%	1%
9	Increased international military presence	41%	35%	18%	4%	2%
10	Decrease in international assistance	39%	43%	15%	3%	2%
11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	32%	30%	22%	10%	6%

Table 5.5. Question 5 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Not sure' about, 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.	Very probable	Probable	Not sure	Improbable	Very improbable
1	Increased criminalisation	70%	22%	7%	0%	1%
2	Renewed violent conflict	62%	33%	4%	1%	0%
3	Increased political instability	61%	30%	7%	1%	0%
4	Escalation of ethnic tensions	59%	32%	9%	0%	0%
5	Social unrest	56%	27%	12%	4%	1%
6	Increased regional instability	51%	30%	15%	2%	1%
7	Increased emigration	49%	33%	16%	1%	1%
8	Increased international military presence	47%	32%	13%	3%	4%
9	Decrease in international assistance	45%	34%	17%	2%	2%
10	Lack of investment	40%	38%	18%	3%	1%
11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	30%	22%	26%	11%	11%

Table 5.6. Question 5 – Serbia Others

	Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Not sure' about, 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.	Very probable	Probable	Not sure	Improbable	Very improbable
1	Increased criminalisation	57%	34%	5%	2%	2%
2	Increased political instability	57%	31%	9%	1%	3%
3	Escalation of ethnic tensions	52%	36%	10%	1%	2%
4	Social unrest	51%	39%	7%	1%	2%
5	Increased regional instability	46%	31%	16%	5%	3%
6	Increased emigration	45%	38%	10%	4%	2%
7	Lack of investment	39%	42%	12%	4%	3%
8	Increased international military presence	39%	34%	18%	5%	5%
9	Renewed violent conflict	39%	43%	13%	2%	3%
10	Decrease in international assistance	35%	43%	15%	3%	4%
11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	31%	29%	24%	11%	6%

Part 2

Solutions

Part 2: Question design and interpreting results

For the second part of the questionnaire, which deals with solutions to problems, the general design of the questions used followed a well tested style that was developed in co-operation with the negotiating teams responsible for the completion of the Northern Ireland peace process and Belfast Agreement. The instructions ‘Choosing your options for peace and stability in the region’, copied below, were given to everyone being interviewed before they answered these questions.

The analysis of the results from these questions tends to focus on the ‘essential’ response in order to find out what the priorities of the different communities are and on ‘unacceptable’ to find out what will be most problematic in negotiations the full results for each question are given in the accompanying tables. These results give a very subtle break down of how each community feel about each issue and should provide both Kosovo Albanian and Serb negotiators with very detailed information on these matters.

Choosing your options for peace and stability in the region

Most of the remainder of this questionnaire will present you with various options on what could be done to improve the prospects for peace and stability in the region.

For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.

For the purposes of this poll ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ mean:

‘Essential’ – *You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better future for the region and should be fully implemented.*

‘Desirable’ – *This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Essential’, but you think this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice.*

‘Acceptable’ – *This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Desirable’, if you were given a choice, but you could certainly ‘live with it’.*

‘Tolerable’ – *This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you would be willing to put up with it.*

‘Unacceptable’ – *This option is completely unacceptable under any circumstances. You would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the region.*

You may use each of the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you wish in each question.

6. Serb and Albanian relations

The question

With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

When it comes to the solutions to the problems reviewed in the first part of this report Kosovo Albanians put Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo at the top of their list at 46% essential from a total of 33 possible options (see tables 6.1 to 6.6). This is followed by Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals and Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade both at 28% essential. Then comes public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs at 25% and student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US at 21% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	46%
2	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	28%
3	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	28%
4	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	25%
5	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	21%

Serbian priorities

The emphasis for Kosovo Serbs, with regards to improving Kosovo Albanian/Serb relations, is on the people of Kosovo doing more to make Kosovo Serbs welcome at 77% essential, the city of Pristina doing more at 70% and the Kosovo government doing more at 61%. Kosovo Serbs would also like a special status for Serb religious sites at 70% essential and Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo at 66% essential. Serbia Serbs agree with all of this but they also think Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions at 63% essential. Again Serb IDPs share the same views but they also emphasise an obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs at 65% essential and to encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions at 64% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	77%	1	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	71%	1	Special status for Serb religious sites	76%
2	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	70%	2	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	67%	2	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	68%
3	Special status for Serb religious sites	70%	3	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	63%	3	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	65%
4	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	66%	4	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	63%	4	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	65%
5	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	61%	5	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	63%	5	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	64%

Clearly improved community relations and with it real political progress will be very much dependent on making Serbs feel truly welcome in Kosovo.

Others

Interestingly both Kosovo and Serb others do emphasise slightly different issues to their mainstream counterparts when it comes to community relations. Kosovo others believe Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs at 38% essential. They also place the teaching of a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools (32% essential) and the separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia (24% essential) in their top five ‘to do’ list. While, with a sense of some equity and balance, Serb others put each side should give up their maximum demands first on their list at 65% essential followed by those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides at 62% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	38%	1	Each side should give up their maximum demands	65%
2	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	37%	2	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	62%
3	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	32%	3	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	55%
4	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	32%	4	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	55%
5	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	24%	5	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	55%

Points of agreement and disagreement

It is much easier to identify the options that are acceptable to both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs using the style of question employed in section 2. In table 6 below all 33 suggestions for improving community relations have been listed in their order of being ‘unacceptable’ for Kosovo Albanians from a low of only 3% unacceptable for student exchange programmes to a high of 80% unacceptable for Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo. Against these values for Kosovo Albanians the levels of ‘unacceptable’ for the three groups of Serbs sampled in these polls have been added in along side each option. For student exchange it is only 8% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 2% for Serbia Serbs and 3% for Serb IDPs. This is clearly a popular option and should be implemented. However, directly below this option is Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade. Most Kosovo Albanians think this is a good idea with only 6% opposed to it as unacceptable. Nineteen percent of Serbia Serbs find this suggestion unacceptable as do 29% of Kosovo Serbs, but 40% of Serb IDPs find it unacceptable. This idea concerns Serb IDPs very much. They clearly rely on the support of Belgrade.

I have marked up all the items where one community or the other finds a suggested policy more than 40% unacceptable as being problematic to implement by shading them ‘grey’. The decision to ‘make this cut’ at 40% is a little arbitrary and almost any value could be used. But experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere suggests that if items get to be much more than 40 to 50 percent unacceptable then they may have to be ‘horse traded’ for something the other community want in negotiations or might have to be ‘sweetened’ in some way, perhaps with some ‘concessions’ or ‘compensation’ from one or another source as part of an overall settlement or ‘package’. In Northern Ireland that source was usually the British Government.

Some of the items in this list are not acceptable to either community. Item 30 for example. No one seems to think mixed schools are a very good idea except of Serbia Serbs who only oppose this suggestion at a level of 17% unacceptable (44% for Kosovo Albanians, 60% for Kosovo Serbs and 45% for Serb IDPs). However, at least half of the items on this list are acceptable or at least tolerable and could be implemented with a little political leadership and cooperation between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. I will not go through the list here. The reader can do that and draw their own conclusions. And if they wish they can explore the results for any policy suggestion in much more detail in tables 6.1 to 6.6.

Table 6. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
	Percent 'Unacceptable'				
1	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	3%	8%	2%	3%
2	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	6%	29%	19%	40%
3	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	10%	7%	0%	1%
4	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	11%	0%	0%	0%
5	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	11%	2%	1%	1%
6	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	11%	17%	11%	12%
7	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	12%	8%	2%	7%
8	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	13%	7%	6%	7%
9	Government support for bilingual media	14%	6%	4%	7%
10	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	15%	20%	26%	48%
11	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	16%	36%	22%	25%
12	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	17%	0%	0%	1%
13	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	17%	33%	5%	21%
14	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	18%	4%	2%	3%
15	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	18%	73%	65%	66%
16	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	19%	21%	28%	28%
17	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	19%	6%	7%	10%
18	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	20%	0%	1%	3%
19	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	21%	6%	4%	1%
20	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	27%	6%	6%	16%
21	Decentralisation at the municipal level	27%	9%	3%	8%
22	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	27%	1%	1%	3%
23	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	28%	3%	0%	0%
24	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	30%	3%	1%	0%
25	Each side should give up their maximum demands	38%	2%	3%	3%
26	Offer higher education in both languages	42%	19%	5%	7%
27	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	43%	1%	3%	1%
28	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	44%	25%	1%	11%
29	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	44%	18%	6%	10%
30	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	47%	60%	17%	45%
31	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	49%	11%	9%	15%
32	Special status for Serb religious sites	53%	2%	1%	0%
33	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	80%	4%	3%	5%

Table 6.1. Question 6 – Kosovo Albanian

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	46%	13%	17%	7%	18%
2	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	28%	24%	22%	15%	11%
3	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	28%	24%	26%	16%	6%
4	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	25%	28%	20%	12%	15%
5	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	21%	37%	29%	10%	3%
6	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	20%	22%	19%	12%	27%
7	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	15%	22%	31%	12%	19%
8	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	14%	13%	25%	28%	20%
9	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	13%	19%	33%	17%	19%
10	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	10%	17%	28%	24%	21%
11	Government support for bilingual media	10%	16%	35%	24%	14%
12	Each side should give up their maximum demands	10%	11%	25%	16%	38%
13	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	10%	32%	35%	11%	13%
14	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	8%	9%	20%	14%	49%
15	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	8%	15%	34%	26%	17%
16	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	8%	27%	32%	22%	11%
17	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	6%	25%	37%	18%	16%
18	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	5%	21%	25%	21%	27%
19	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	5%	16%	43%	19%	17%
20	Decentralisation at the municipal level	5%	9%	31%	28%	27%
21	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	5%	8%	6%	1%	80%
22	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	5%	21%	41%	24%	10%
23	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	4%	15%	31%	38%	12%
24	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	3%	10%	19%	21%	47%
25	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	3%	20%	29%	30%	18%
26	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	3%	16%	17%	20%	43%
27	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	2%	16%	27%	28%	28%
28	Special status for Serb religious sites	2%	7%	14%	23%	53%
29	Offer higher education in both languages	2%	13%	23%	20%	42%
30	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	2%	11%	21%	23%	44%
31	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	1%	10%	29%	30%	30%
32	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	0%	11%	28%	17%	44%
33	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	0%	8%	36%	45%	11%

Table 6.2. Question 6 – Kosovo Serbs

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	77%	18%	4%	0%	1%
2	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	70%	25%	4%	1%	0%
3	Special status for Serb religious sites	70%	21%	7%	0%	2%
4	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	66%	21%	5%	4%	4%
5	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	61%	29%	6%	5%	0%
6	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	53%	29%	9%	2%	7%
7	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	51%	26%	17%	4%	2%
8	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	48%	34%	15%	2%	1%
9	Decentralisation at the municipal level	47%	27%	11%	6%	9%
10	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	46%	35%	15%	3%	0%
11	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	46%	32%	11%	5%	6%
12	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	43%	47%	4%	3%	3%
13	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	41%	41%	13%	2%	3%
14	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	41%	24%	5%	4%	25%
15	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	41%	40%	14%	1%	4%
16	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	38%	26%	18%	12%	6%
17	Offer higher education in both languages	32%	29%	11%	9%	19%
18	Each side should give up their maximum demands	31%	34%	22%	11%	2%
19	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	29%	41%	17%	5%	8%
20	Government support for bilingual media	26%	28%	14%	27%	6%
21	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	24%	39%	14%	11%	11%
22	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	23%	22%	21%	17%	17%
23	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	22%	36%	19%	14%	8%
24	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	21%	38%	28%	8%	6%
25	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	18%	13%	22%	25%	21%
26	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	18%	24%	16%	25%	18%
27	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	17%	24%	13%	13%	33%
28	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	14%	31%	16%	18%	20%
29	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	14%	38%	24%	17%	7%
30	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	10%	18%	17%	26%	29%
31	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	9%	16%	4%	11%	60%
32	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	8%	17%	12%	26%	36%
33	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	1%	9%	10%	7%	73%

Table 6.3. Question 6 – Kosovo Others

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	38%	32%	4%	26%	0%
2	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	37%	6%	11%	9%	36%
3	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	32%	0%	27%	21%	20%
4	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	32%	25%	13%	30%	0%
5	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	24%	28%	13%	13%	21%
6	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	24%	18%	36%	22%	0%
7	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	23%	8%	32%	0%	36%
8	Decentralisation at the municipal level	20%	8%	35%	0%	36%
9	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	17%	27%	19%	15%	22%
10	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	17%	16%	41%	22%	4%
11	Special status for Serb religious sites	14%	0%	11%	35%	40%
12	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	13%	18%	11%	57%	0%
13	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	13%	41%	0%	0%	45%
14	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	13%	6%	24%	51%	6%
15	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	13%	0%	25%	18%	45%
16	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	13%	10%	7%	66%	4%
17	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	13%	10%	17%	48%	13%
18	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	13%	8%	40%	39%	0%
19	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	13%	32%	43%	8%	4%
20	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	11%	9%	23%	23%	33%
21	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	11%	26%	6%	16%	41%
22	Each side should give up their maximum demands	10%	8%	25%	24%	32%
23	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	9%	11%	39%	31%	10%
24	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	6%	20%	55%	19%	0%
25	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	4%	6%	40%	50%	0%
26	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	4%	0%	25%	71%	0%
27	Government support for bilingual media	4%	0%	52%	44%	0%
28	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	4%	15%	24%	51%	6%
29	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	0%	59%	24%	13%	4%
30	Offer higher education in both languages	0%	17%	7%	72%	4%
31	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	0%	17%	26%	32%	25%
32	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	0%	17%	4%	47%	32%
33	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	0%	34%	49%	17%	0%

Table 6.4. Question 6 – Serbia Serb

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	71%	23%	3%	2%	0%
2	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	67%	27%	5%	1%	1%
3	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	63%	22%	7%	4%	3%
4	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	63%	29%	6%	1%	1%
5	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	63%	30%	4%	3%	1%
6	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	61%	30%	7%	2%	0%
7	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	61%	26%	7%	2%	4%
8	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	59%	32%	6%	1%	2%
9	Special status for Serb religious sites	57%	34%	6%	2%	1%
10	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	56%	28%	9%	4%	3%
11	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	54%	36%	8%	2%	0%
12	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	52%	36%	6%	6%	0%
13	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	51%	25%	13%	4%	7%
14	Each side should give up their maximum demands	51%	30%	13%	2%	3%
15	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	49%	38%	10%	2%	1%
16	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	47%	40%	9%	2%	1%
17	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	41%	23%	14%	11%	11%
18	Offer higher education in both languages	38%	33%	18%	6%	5%
19	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	38%	46%	11%	3%	2%
20	Decentralisation at the municipal level	34%	39%	19%	6%	3%
21	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	31%	37%	17%	6%	9%
22	Government support for bilingual media	31%	38%	15%	12%	4%
23	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	31%	33%	19%	12%	6%
24	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	31%	38%	16%	10%	6%
25	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	30%	44%	19%	5%	2%
26	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	30%	35%	22%	9%	5%
27	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	28%	41%	17%	8%	6%
28	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	25%	27%	19%	11%	17%
29	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	18%	21%	18%	17%	26%
30	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	17%	24%	27%	12%	19%
31	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	15%	29%	18%	11%	28%
32	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	11%	26%	23%	18%	22%
33	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	8%	8%	7%	12%	65%

Table 6.5. Question 6 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Special status for Serb religious sites	76%	19%	4%	0%	0%
2	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	68%	24%	5%	0%	3%
3	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	65%	21%	10%	3%	1%
4	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	65%	26%	4%	3%	3%
5	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	64%	19%	10%	4%	3%
6	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	64%	23%	2%	0%	11%
7	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	61%	20%	8%	6%	5%
8	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	61%	34%	5%	0%	0%
9	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	60%	23%	5%	4%	7%
10	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	58%	30%	12%	0%	0%
11	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	58%	21%	8%	3%	10%
12	Offer higher education in both languages	55%	21%	15%	1%	7%
13	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	54%	26%	17%	2%	1%
14	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	54%	36%	9%	0%	1%
15	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	53%	36%	10%	1%	0%
16	Each side should give up their maximum demands	51%	23%	17%	5%	3%
17	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	47%	19%	11%	10%	12%
18	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	47%	32%	19%	1%	1%
19	Decentralisation at the municipal level	46%	32%	11%	3%	8%
20	Government support for bilingual media	45%	25%	19%	4%	7%
21	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	40%	28%	9%	9%	15%
22	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	36%	42%	18%	2%	1%
23	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	33%	34%	22%	7%	3%
24	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	33%	28%	21%	9%	10%
25	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	27%	36%	13%	8%	16%
26	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	26%	49%	15%	3%	7%
27	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	21%	21%	21%	16%	21%
28	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	19%	11%	15%	10%	45%
29	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	16%	14%	8%	13%	48%
30	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	14%	22%	25%	10%	28%
31	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	13%	27%	18%	16%	25%
32	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	8%	19%	25%	7%	40%
33	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	6%	8%	19%	2%	66%

Table 6.6. Question 6 – Serbia Others

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Each side should give up their maximum demands	65%	19%	7%	5%	4%
2	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	62%	22%	12%	0%	4%
3	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	55%	31%	11%	1%	2%
4	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	55%	34%	5%	3%	3%
5	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	55%	18%	11%	7%	9%
6	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	54%	27%	9%	4%	6%
7	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	54%	33%	9%	1%	3%
8	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	53%	39%	5%	0%	2%
9	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	53%	21%	8%	8%	10%
10	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	48%	30%	17%	2%	3%
11	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	46%	35%	16%	2%	2%
12	Special status for Serb religious sites	45%	28%	18%	5%	4%
13	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	45%	41%	6%	4%	4%
14	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	44%	16%	22%	10%	8%
15	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	42%	43%	9%	2%	4%
16	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	39%	49%	8%	2%	2%
17	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	38%	31%	8%	12%	11%
18	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	33%	45%	14%	4%	4%
19	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	32%	38%	16%	5%	9%
20	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	31%	34%	24%	5%	7%
21	Government support for bilingual media	30%	41%	14%	7%	8%
22	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	30%	38%	18%	4%	11%
23	Offer higher education in both languages	30%	41%	19%	6%	5%
24	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	29%	47%	18%	3%	3%
25	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	28%	22%	24%	8%	19%
26	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	26%	43%	21%	6%	5%
27	Decentralisation at the municipal level	26%	32%	33%	6%	3%
28	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	25%	28%	16%	13%	19%
29	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	22%	37%	18%	8%	15%
30	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	21%	52%	18%	4%	6%
31	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	20%	32%	20%	8%	20%
32	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	14%	14%	14%	9%	48%
33	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	12%	26%	26%	17%	20%

7. Security

The question

With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

The proposal that Mitrovica should become a unified city comes in at the top of the list of Kosovo Albanian priorities for security at 83% essential (see tables 7.1 to 7.6). Kosovo Albanians also place a great deal of importance on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal at 67% essential, establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior at 63% and better training for the police and one legal government both at 59% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Mitrovica should become a unified city	83%
2	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	67%
3	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	63%
4	Better training for the police	59%
5	One legal government	59%

Serbian priorities

The number one security priority for Kosovo Serbs is to have Serb police guard monasteries in Kosovo at 67% essential. All Serbs believe the security forces should be made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups at 66% essential for Kosovo Serbs, 68% for Serbia Serbs and 75% for Serb IDPs. Serb IDPs place the need for a special property court to deal with property disputes at the top of their list at 82% essential. This item is also in the 'top five' for Kosovo Serbs at 47% essential. Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime and all ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties also feature in the 'top five' of Kosovo Serb, Serbia Serb and Serb IDPs lists. However Kosovo Serbs also place North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities third in their list at 50% essential. The emphasis in all of this seems to be the application of the rule of law both in Kosovo and throughout the region and an accountable police service.

Essential - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	67%	1	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	68%	1	Special property court to deal with property disputes	82%
2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	66%	2	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	63%	2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	75%
3	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	51%	3	More efficient and effective judicial system	63%	3	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	72%
4	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	50%	4	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	62%	4	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	67%
5	Special property court to deal with property disputes	47%	5	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	59%	5	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	66%

Others

Interestingly Kosovo others share the concern or need for a special property court to deal with property disputes with Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo others put this item first in their list of priorities at 80% essential while Serbia others place decommissioning of privately held weapons first at 62% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Special property court to deal with property disputes	80%	1	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	62%
2	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	79%	2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	61%
3	One legal government	73%	3	More efficient and effective judicial system	59%
4	Better training for the police	70%	4	One legal government	52%
5	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	54%	5	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	52%

Points of agreement and disagreement

The points of agreement and disagreement have been analysed and identified in the same way as previously done in question 6. Those items, from a list of 32, which Serbs or Kosovo Albanians identify as being more than 40% unacceptable have been highlighted in grey in table 7 below.

At the present time both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians do not trust each other to take care of security and justice. Sixty five percent of Kosovo Serbs and 49% of Serb IDPs do not want Kosovo to establish their own Ministry of the Interior or their own war crimes court at 67% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 53% unacceptable for Serbia Serbs and 55% unacceptable for Serb IDPs. Similarly 70% of Kosovo Albanians do not want Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo. But both communities do want a whole range of reforms that will make the criminal justice system fairer, more efficient and accountable. Interestingly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs do not want the establishment of separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps (59% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 44% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 33% for Serbia Serbs and 34% for Serb IDPs). However, most importantly, no one is opposed to the idea that all ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties. The percentage unacceptable for this item was Kosovo Albanian 1%, Kosovo Serb 0%, Serbia Serb 0% and Serb IDPs 0%. Clearly such prosecutions and the reform of the criminal justice system are the first steps that need to be taken to the establishment of real security for all.

Having joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo may be a workable compromise on this issue as the level of opposition seems to be balanced at 33% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 29% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs. But there is no consensus on the future of Mitrovica, 94% of Kosovo Albanians are opposed to separate municipalities as unacceptable while 64% of Kosovo Serbs, 11% of Serbia Serbs and 42% of Serb IDPs are opposed to a unified municipality as unacceptable. Perhaps questions of security will have to be satisfactorily dealt with before this kind of problem can be addressed.

Table 7. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
	Percent ‘Unacceptable’				
1	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	0%	65%	24%	49%
2	Better training for the police	0%	0%	1%	17%
3	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	0%	7%	3%	20%
4	Special property court to deal with property disputes	0%	0%	0%	1%
5	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	0%	1%	0%	3%
6	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	0%	14%	3%	9%
7	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	0%	67%	53%	55%
8	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	1%	9%	2%	24%
9	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	1%	0%	0%	0%
10	More efficient and effective judicial system	1%	3%	0%	0%
11	Properly paid safe judges	1%	3%	0%	5%
12	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	1%	4%	3%	8%
13	Mitrovica should become a unified city	1%	64%	11%	42%
14	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	1%	14%	13%	8%
15	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	2%	2%	0%	2%
16	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	2%	4%	0%	0%
17	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	3%	51%	14%	30%
18	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	4%	23%	5%	24%
19	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	4%	28%	6%	15%
20	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	5%	8%	8%	9%
21	One legal government	5%	21%	4%	6%
22	One unified judicial system	8%	16%	3%	5%
23	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	10%	15%	3%	7%
24	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	10%	13%	5%	9%
25	Demilitarisation of border regions	14%	35%	24%	20%
26	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	28%	26%	5%	16%
27	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	33%	29%	2%	25%
28	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	59%	44%	33%	34%
29	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	70%	2%	3%	6%
30	Two official languages	77%	22%	21%	7%
31	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	78%	18%	19%	39%
32	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	94%	14%	23%	11%

Table 7.1. Question 7 – Kosovo Albanian

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Mitrovica should become a unified city	83%	12%	4%	1%	1%
2	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	67%	23%	8%	2%	1%
3	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	63%	28%	8%	1%	0%
4	Better training for the police	59%	30%	10%	1%	0%
5	One legal government	59%	21%	13%	2%	5%
6	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	55%	32%	11%	2%	0%
7	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	51%	29%	14%	6%	0%
8	More efficient and effective judicial system	48%	30%	17%	4%	1%
9	One unified judicial system	47%	28%	16%	1%	8%
10	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	43%	35%	19%	4%	0%
11	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	42%	33%	21%	4%	1%
12	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	41%	32%	21%	5%	2%
13	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	36%	32%	26%	5%	1%
14	Special property court to deal with property disputes	36%	49%	14%	1%	0%
15	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	35%	26%	24%	13%	3%
16	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	34%	35%	22%	7%	1%
17	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	34%	33%	24%	7%	2%
18	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	33%	51%	13%	3%	0%
19	Properly paid safe judges	33%	39%	23%	4%	1%
20	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	26%	33%	30%	7%	4%
21	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	24%	35%	20%	11%	10%
22	Demilitarisation of border regions	20%	21%	35%	10%	14%
23	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	18%	27%	40%	11%	4%
24	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	17%	18%	38%	17%	10%
25	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	16%	38%	30%	11%	5%
26	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	10%	12%	23%	21%	33%
27	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	5%	13%	34%	19%	28%
28	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	5%	11%	12%	13%	59%
29	Two official languages	3%	4%	9%	7%	77%
30	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	3%	2%	2%	0%	94%
31	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	1%	3%	9%	18%	70%
32	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	1%	6%	8%	7%	78%

Table 7.2. Question 7 – Kosovo Serb

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	67%	23%	5%	3%	2%
2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	66%	25%	5%	3%	2%
3	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	51%	33%	13%	3%	1%
4	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	50%	19%	5%	12%	14%
5	Special property court to deal with property disputes	47%	42%	10%	0%	0%
6	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	43%	44%	12%	1%	0%
7	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	42%	33%	10%	8%	7%
8	Properly paid safe judges	41%	41%	14%	2%	3%
9	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	40%	31%	7%	6%	15%
10	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	38%	37%	11%	6%	8%
11	Better training for the police	36%	43%	17%	4%	0%
12	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	35%	41%	17%	3%	4%
13	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	34%	30%	18%	15%	4%
14	Two official languages	33%	28%	7%	10%	22%
15	More efficient and effective judicial system	29%	50%	13%	5%	3%
16	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	28%	44%	15%	5%	9%
17	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	28%	39%	11%	9%	13%
18	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	28%	29%	11%	14%	18%
19	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	26%	34%	21%	4%	14%
20	One legal government	25%	25%	16%	13%	21%
21	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	22%	24%	14%	14%	26%
22	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	21%	31%	14%	20%	14%
23	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	21%	24%	10%	16%	28%
24	Demilitarisation of border regions	20%	18%	14%	14%	35%
25	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	19%	19%	19%	21%	23%
26	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	19%	27%	14%	11%	29%
27	One unified judicial system	19%	42%	13%	10%	16%
28	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	18%	11%	11%	9%	51%
29	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	13%	19%	10%	15%	44%
30	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	13%	10%	2%	8%	67%
31	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	11%	8%	7%	9%	65%
32	Mitrovica should become a unified city	8%	16%	3%	8%	64%

Table 7.3. Question 7 – Kosovo Others

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Special property court to deal with property disputes	80%	13%	0%	7%	0%
2	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	79%	8%	0%	0%	13%
3	One legal government	73%	0%	4%	13%	10%
4	Better training for the police	70%	30%	0%	0%	0%
5	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	54%	25%	13%	8%	0%
6	More efficient and effective judicial system	52%	15%	20%	6%	8%
7	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	47%	24%	29%	0%	0%
8	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	42%	8%	18%	32%	0%
9	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	40%	45%	7%	8%	0%
10	Properly paid safe judges	38%	13%	43%	7%	0%
11	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	38%	31%	8%	6%	18%
12	Mitrovica should become a unified city	36%	10%	41%	0%	13%
13	One unified judicial system	36%	6%	35%	15%	8%
14	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	33%	52%	15%	0%	0%
15	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	32%	45%	0%	23%	0%
16	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	32%	10%	49%	8%	0%
17	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	29%	43%	16%	13%	0%
18	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	25%	13%	15%	7%	41%
19	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	25%	55%	20%	0%	0%
20	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	24%	11%	49%	15%	0%
21	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	20%	13%	35%	0%	32%
22	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	18%	34%	32%	16%	0%
23	Two official languages	17%	32%	0%	10%	41%
24	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	17%	24%	16%	15%	28%
25	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	17%	0%	0%	10%	73%
26	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	16%	0%	44%	20%	19%
27	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	13%	17%	0%	18%	53%
28	Demilitarisation of border regions	11%	22%	29%	15%	24%
29	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	9%	15%	31%	16%	28%
30	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	9%	6%	5%	8%	73%
31	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	8%	26%	32%	35%	0%
32	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	0%	6%	6%	13%	75%

Table 7.4. Question 7 – Serbia Serb

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	68%	25%	6%	1%	0%
2	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	63%	26%	6%	3%	3%
3	More efficient and effective judicial system	63%	29%	6%	1%	0%
4	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	62%	28%	8%	1%	0%
5	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	59%	29%	10%	2%	0%
6	Special property court to deal with property disputes	55%	34%	9%	2%	0%
7	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	54%	31%	8%	3%	3%
8	Properly paid safe judges	52%	33%	13%	2%	0%
9	One unified judicial system	50%	30%	13%	4%	3%
10	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	48%	28%	12%	7%	5%
11	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	47%	33%	12%	5%	2%
12	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	46%	42%	11%	2%	0%
13	One legal government	45%	25%	18%	8%	4%
14	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	44%	38%	10%	3%	5%
15	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	40%	33%	16%	6%	6%
16	Better training for the police	35%	46%	14%	4%	1%
17	Mitrovica should become a unified city	34%	23%	16%	15%	11%
18	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	34%	32%	23%	7%	5%
19	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	33%	38%	19%	8%	3%
20	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	31%	47%	15%	5%	2%
21	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	31%	39%	23%	4%	3%
22	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	29%	47%	17%	4%	3%
23	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	29%	24%	23%	11%	13%
24	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	28%	32%	20%	12%	8%
25	Two official languages	27%	23%	16%	13%	21%
26	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	24%	20%	18%	14%	24%
27	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	22%	25%	25%	14%	14%
28	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	21%	25%	17%	14%	23%
29	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	19%	22%	21%	19%	19%
30	Demilitarisation of border regions	15%	24%	21%	17%	24%
31	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	12%	17%	22%	16%	33%
32	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	8%	12%	11%	16%	53%

Table 7.5. Question 7 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Special property court to deal with property disputes	82%	15%	2%	0%	1%
2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	75%	19%	4%	0%	2%
3	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	72%	14%	8%	1%	6%
4	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	67%	23%	6%	4%	0%
5	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	66%	21%	8%	2%	3%
6	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	60%	25%	5%	1%	9%
7	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	60%	25%	7%	0%	7%
8	Properly paid safe judges	53%	33%	8%	0%	5%
9	More efficient and effective judicial system	52%	29%	18%	1%	0%
10	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	44%	36%	19%	1%	0%
11	One legal government	43%	35%	15%	1%	6%
12	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	40%	25%	18%	9%	8%
13	One unified judicial system	39%	34%	20%	2%	5%
14	Two official languages	35%	36%	18%	4%	7%
15	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	32%	24%	16%	4%	24%
16	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	32%	25%	16%	2%	24%
17	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	32%	28%	15%	1%	25%
18	Better training for the police	31%	30%	20%	2%	17%
19	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	30%	38%	12%	1%	20%
20	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	30%	34%	14%	7%	16%
21	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	30%	28%	24%	9%	9%
22	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	29%	34%	17%	6%	15%
23	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	28%	6%	8%	9%	49%
24	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	27%	38%	22%	5%	8%
25	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	23%	32%	34%	2%	9%
26	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	22%	31%	25%	11%	11%
27	Mitrovica should become a unified city	21%	13%	12%	12%	42%
28	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	21%	15%	12%	23%	30%
29	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	20%	31%	10%	5%	34%
30	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	15%	25%	13%	9%	39%
31	Demilitarisation of border regions	14%	22%	24%	20%	20%
32	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	13%	10%	19%	3%	55%

Table 7.6. Question 7 – Serbia Others

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	62%	29%	3%	0%	6%
2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	61%	28%	8%	1%	2%
3	More efficient and effective judicial system	59%	33%	7%	0%	1%
4	One legal government	52%	33%	5%	4%	6%
5	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	52%	36%	6%	3%	3%
6	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	52%	38%	6%	0%	3%
7	Special property court to deal with property disputes	51%	29%	16%	0%	3%
8	Properly paid safe judges	47%	42%	7%	1%	3%
9	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	47%	32%	15%	1%	4%
10	One unified judicial system	46%	38%	11%	4%	1%
11	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	42%	46%	10%	1%	1%
12	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	41%	43%	9%	2%	4%
13	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	38%	33%	17%	4%	8%
14	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	36%	38%	11%	11%	4%
15	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	36%	41%	11%	9%	4%
16	Mitrovica should become a unified city	35%	33%	17%	6%	10%
17	Two official languages	34%	33%	17%	4%	11%
18	Better training for the police	32%	50%	11%	1%	6%
19	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	32%	41%	22%	1%	4%
20	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	31%	32%	21%	3%	13%
21	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	30%	43%	14%	5%	8%
22	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	28%	31%	22%	8%	12%
23	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	27%	36%	22%	5%	11%
24	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	27%	46%	21%	2%	4%
25	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	26%	56%	13%	2%	4%
26	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	22%	60%	12%	1%	5%
27	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	22%	37%	24%	9%	8%
28	Demilitarisation of border regions	19%	23%	33%	11%	13%
29	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	11%	37%	11%	11%	30%
30	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	10%	9%	21%	16%	45%
31	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	8%	22%	28%	15%	28%
32	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	6%	20%	22%	21%	31%

8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo

Question

With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

Fifty nine percent of Kosovo Albanians consider it essential that Belgrade agree final status. They would also like the US to be more pro-active at 57% essential, for the international community to agree final status (56% essential), for there to be a referendum in Kosovo on final status (53% essential) and for talks in both the US and EU (49% essential). So Kosovo Albanian priorities seem to emphasise the involvement of the international community in both negotiations and the recognition of final status and, naturally, they would like a referendum (see tables 8.1 to 8.6).

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Belgrade will have to agree final status	59%
2	The US should be more pro-active	57%
3	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	56%
4	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	53%
5	Talks in the US and EU	49%

Serbian priorities

Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs both want the international community to involve Belgrade more at 70% and 72% essential respectively. Serbia Serbs also take the view that Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs (73% essential) and that Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table (71% essential). Naturally Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs agree. Both Serbia Serbs (65% essential) and Kosovo Serbs (58% essential) put the requirement that the international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background in their top five priorities and 'open talks' are in the top five for both Serb IDPs (79% essential) and Kosovo Serbs (60% essential). However Kosovo Serbs, perhaps understandably, also put meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations as their third priority at 58% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	International community should involve Belgrade more	70%	1	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	73%	1	Belgrade's priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	80%
2	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	61%	2	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	71%	2	Open talks	79%
3	Open talks	60%	3	Belgrade's priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	69%	3	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	76%
4	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	58%	4	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	65%	4	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	75%
5	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	58%	5	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	63%	5	International community should involve Belgrade more	72%

Although the priorities of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are a little different these points of negotiation procedure or what are sometimes referred to as 'shape of the table' questions are not necessarily mutually exclusive so most of them can be given the attention of Pristina, Belgrade and the international community.

Others

The views and priorities of others in both Kosovo and Serbia are very similar to those of their respective Albanian and Serb majorities with the exception of training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs which Kosovo others place second on their list at 48% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	Belgrade will have to agree final status	65%	1	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	70%
2	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	48%	2	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	67%
3	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	45%	3	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	66%
4	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	45%	4	Open talks	65%
5	Open talks	43%	5	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	62%

Points of agreement and disagreement

As can easily be seen from the lack of grey in table 8 below most of the suggestions for negotiations are acceptable to both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alike. However there are a few notable exceptions.

There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status is not supported by 84% of Kosovo Serbs as unacceptable, 63% of Serbs as unacceptable and 52% of Serb IDPs as unacceptable. Conversely there should be a referendum in Serbia on final status is not supported by 66% of Kosovo Albanians as unacceptable.

Although all Serbs want Kosovo Serbs to be in negotiations Kosovo Serbs have strong reservations about elections in this regard. Forty percent of Kosovo Serbs consider the idea that Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations to be unacceptable. One way or another a resolution to this problem is going to have to be found, as everyone seems to agree that Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade, at only 3% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 2% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 3% unacceptable for Serbia Serbs and 9% unacceptable for Serb IDPs.

Kosovo Serbs do not want the international community to impose a settlement if negotiations fail (46% unacceptable) and 54% of Kosovo Albanians do not want the Serbian Orthodox Church to have a role in negotiations. But no one wants secret talks at 67% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 71% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs and 72% unacceptable for both Serbia Serbs and Serb IDPs.

Table 8. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
	Percent ‘Unacceptable’				
1	An open forum for political parties and experts	0%	4%	2%	18%
2	Talks in the US and EU	0%	36%	32%	25%
3	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	0%	12%	4%	12%
4	The EU should be more pro-active	0%	8%	5%	11%
5	The US should be more pro-active	0%	32%	28%	15%
6	The Contact Group should have one position	1%	4%	3%	1%
7	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	1%	7%	5%	15%
8	Belgrade will have to agree final status	1%	25%	7%	22%
9	Open talks	2%	2%	1%	0%
10	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	2%	6%	5%	2%
11	Fixed time table for negotiations	2%	4%	1%	7%
12	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	3%	2%	3%	9%
13	The EU and US should have one position	3%	9%	7%	6%
14	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	4%	40%	23%	34%
15	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	4%	4%	10%	10%
16	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	4%	13%	7%	10%
17	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	5%	84%	63%	52%
18	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	11%	1%	1%	0%
19	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	12%	3%	8%	10%
20	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	14%	14%	5%	3%
21	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	15%	1%	5%	6%
22	International penalties for not negotiating	15%	11%	8%	10%
23	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	17%	8%	0%	0%
24	International community should involve Belgrade more	17%	0%	2%	8%
25	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	17%	46%	36%	28%
26	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	19%	4%	1%	0%
27	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	20%	7%	1%	1%
28	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	21%	21%	3%	0%
29	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	22%	4%	5%	4%
30	Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	23%	17%	3%	1%
31	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	23%	4%	0%	0%
32	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	24%	19%	9%	9%
33	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	27%	1%	0%	0%
34	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	31%	6%	9%	4%
35	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	32%	5%	1%	0%
36	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	34%	6%	3%	17%
37	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	36%	23%	8%	15%
38	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	39%	16%	14%	4%
39	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	54%	13%	8%	3%
40	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	66%	17%	28%	18%
41	Secret talks	67%	71%	72%	72%

Table 8.1. Question 8 – Kosovo Albanian

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Belgrade will have to agree final status	59%	24%	13%	3%	1%
2	The US should be more pro-active	57%	29%	11%	3%	0%
3	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	56%	25%	16%	3%	0%
4	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	53%	27%	11%	4%	5%
5	Talks in the US and EU	49%	32%	17%	1%	0%
6	The EU and US should have one position	49%	23%	18%	7%	3%
7	The EU should be more pro-active	46%	27%	16%	11%	0%
8	An open forum for political parties and experts	41%	43%	14%	2%	0%
9	Open talks	41%	22%	21%	15%	2%
10	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	38%	24%	27%	7%	3%
11	The Contact Group should have one position	38%	37%	21%	2%	1%
12	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	32%	26%	13%	8%	21%
13	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	31%	26%	23%	15%	4%
14	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	31%	29%	22%	8%	11%
15	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	30%	37%	16%	12%	4%
16	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	26%	41%	30%	2%	1%
17	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	24%	41%	25%	5%	4%
18	Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	22%	24%	20%	12%	23%
19	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	21%	34%	21%	8%	15%
20	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	21%	27%	37%	12%	2%
21	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	21%	25%	26%	11%	17%
22	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	18%	18%	32%	10%	22%
23	International community should involve Belgrade more	17%	22%	20%	24%	17%
24	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	16%	36%	25%	12%	12%
25	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	16%	14%	27%	13%	31%
26	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	15%	17%	27%	16%	24%
27	International penalties for not negotiating	14%	31%	24%	16%	15%
28	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	13%	19%	31%	17%	20%
29	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	11%	14%	28%	28%	19%
30	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	10%	11%	6%	7%	66%
31	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	9%	18%	32%	23%	17%
32	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	9%	34%	30%	13%	14%
33	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	8%	15%	20%	22%	34%
34	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	8%	15%	25%	13%	39%
35	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	6%	10%	33%	27%	23%
36	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	6%	14%	28%	17%	36%
37	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	6%	21%	21%	20%	32%
38	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	5%	25%	27%	16%	27%
39	Fixed time table for negotiations	4%	32%	43%	19%	2%
40	Secret talks	4%	5%	13%	11%	67%
41	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	2%	2%	6%	35%	54%

Table 8.2. Question 8 – Kosovo Serb

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	International community should involve Belgrade more	70%	25%	2%	2%	0%
2	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	61%	30%	1%	4%	4%
3	Open talks	60%	33%	6%	0%	2%
4	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	58%	27%	7%	7%	1%
5	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	58%	31%	7%	3%	1%
6	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	54%	31%	10%	2%	4%
7	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	53%	37%	4%	1%	4%
8	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	50%	17%	6%	6%	21%
9	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	49%	32%	8%	9%	2%
10	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	49%	36%	6%	1%	8%
11	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	48%	38%	10%	3%	1%
12	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	47%	37%	4%	7%	6%
13	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	43%	34%	7%	9%	7%
14	The Contact Group should have one position	41%	36%	12%	6%	4%
15	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	41%	29%	10%	7%	12%
16	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	40%	43%	9%	3%	5%
17	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	39%	36%	18%	4%	3%
18	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	39%	40%	15%	3%	4%
19	Fixed time table for negotiations	36%	50%	8%	1%	4%
20	The EU should be more pro-active	36%	38%	13%	5%	8%
21	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	36%	34%	9%	5%	16%
22	The EU and US should have one position	36%	36%	12%	7%	9%
23	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	33%	31%	12%	10%	13%
24	International penalties for not negotiating	33%	40%	12%	4%	11%
25	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	33%	29%	11%	8%	19%
26	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	32%	38%	4%	9%	17%
27	Belgrade will have to agree final status	29%	26%	10%	10%	25%
28	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	26%	38%	19%	11%	6%
29	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	26%	43%	19%	6%	6%
30	Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	26%	35%	9%	13%	17%
31	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	25%	48%	7%	6%	14%
32	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	22%	39%	24%	8%	7%
33	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	19%	38%	20%	11%	13%
34	The US should be more pro-active	18%	23%	12%	14%	32%
35	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	17%	37%	10%	13%	23%
36	An open forum for political parties and experts	16%	57%	14%	8%	4%
37	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	14%	28%	9%	8%	40%
38	Talks in the US and EU	14%	14%	11%	24%	36%
39	Secret talks	9%	6%	1%	12%	71%
40	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	8%	24%	8%	14%	46%
41	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	5%	5%	6%	0%	84%

Table 8.3. Question 8 – Kosovo Others

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Belgrade will have to agree final status	65%	16%	0%	0%	19%
2	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	48%	33%	19%	0%	0%
3	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	45%	19%	18%	18%	0%
4	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	45%	12%	13%	0%	30%
5	Open talks	43%	25%	32%	0%	0%
6	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	40%	0%	0%	56%	4%
7	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	37%	28%	16%	0%	19%
8	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	35%	41%	7%	17%	0%
9	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	34%	22%	13%	31%	0%
10	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	33%	35%	32%	0%	0%
11	Talks in the US and EU	32%	19%	36%	13%	0%
12	The EU should be more pro-active	32%	32%	36%	0%	0%
13	Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	32%	20%	23%	0%	24%
14	The EU and US should have one position	30%	38%	32%	0%	0%
15	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	29%	0%	15%	56%	0%
16	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	29%	6%	13%	20%	32%
17	An open forum for political parties and experts	28%	32%	41%	0%	0%
18	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	22%	23%	6%	26%	24%
19	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	21%	25%	54%	0%	0%
20	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	17%	27%	48%	8%	0%
21	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	17%	10%	41%	12%	20%
22	International community should involve Belgrade more	13%	19%	32%	0%	36%
23	International penalties for not negotiating	13%	49%	17%	20%	0%
24	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	13%	27%	26%	27%	6%
25	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	12%	41%	36%	11%	0%
26	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	10%	7%	8%	38%	36%
27	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	10%	26%	26%	11%	28%
28	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	10%	35%	29%	26%	0%
29	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	10%	26%	40%	24%	0%
30	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	10%	44%	20%	16%	9%
31	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	9%	0%	64%	27%	0%
32	The Contact Group should have one position	9%	42%	35%	14%	0%
33	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	9%	17%	26%	22%	26%
34	The US should be more pro-active	6%	65%	20%	0%	9%
35	Fixed time table for negotiations	0%	27%	32%	41%	0%
36	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	0%	25%	13%	18%	45%
37	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	0%	37%	43%	0%	21%
38	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	0%	13%	10%	16%	61%
39	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	0%	19%	18%	21%	42%
40	Secret talks	0%	0%	0%	8%	92%
41	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	0%	0%	11%	15%	73%

Table 8.4. Question 8 – Serbia Serb

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	73%	22%	4%	1%	0%
2	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	71%	23%	5%	1%	0%
3	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	69%	23%	6%	1%	1%
4	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	65%	27%	5%	1%	1%
5	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	63%	26%	9%	2%	0%
6	Open talks	60%	28%	9%	2%	1%
7	International community should involve Belgrade more	57%	28%	10%	4%	2%
8	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	56%	28%	9%	4%	3%
9	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	56%	29%	11%	2%	1%
10	Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	54%	26%	14%	2%	3%
11	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	53%	27%	10%	4%	5%
12	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	49%	28%	15%	5%	3%
13	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	44%	32%	11%	8%	5%
14	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	39%	29%	20%	8%	4%
15	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	39%	32%	23%	4%	1%
16	Fixed time table for negotiations	37%	41%	18%	4%	1%
17	The EU should be more pro-active	37%	32%	19%	8%	5%
18	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	37%	29%	14%	7%	14%
19	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	37%	30%	22%	9%	3%
20	The Contact Group should have one position	36%	35%	17%	9%	3%
21	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	33%	30%	21%	10%	5%
22	International penalties for not negotiating	33%	30%	20%	9%	8%
23	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	32%	33%	16%	11%	9%
24	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	32%	29%	18%	12%	8%
25	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	31%	31%	18%	11%	8%
26	Belgrade will have to agree final status	31%	32%	19%	12%	7%
27	The EU and US should have one position	30%	30%	20%	13%	7%
28	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	27%	32%	25%	9%	7%
29	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	27%	32%	23%	10%	8%
30	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	24%	35%	29%	8%	5%
31	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	24%	35%	19%	12%	9%
32	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	22%	21%	18%	11%	28%
33	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	21%	20%	20%	16%	23%
34	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	21%	26%	29%	14%	10%
35	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	20%	46%	21%	7%	5%
36	An open forum for political parties and experts	20%	44%	24%	9%	2%
37	The US should be more pro-active	12%	18%	22%	20%	28%
38	Talks in the US and EU	11%	14%	27%	18%	32%
39	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	11%	16%	19%	17%	36%
40	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	8%	10%	7%	11%	63%
41	Secret talks	3%	5%	8%	12%	72%

Table 8.5. Question 8 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	80%	14%	5%	0%	0%
2	Open talks	79%	18%	2%	0%	0%
3	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	76%	19%	4%	0%	0%
4	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	75%	15%	9%	1%	0%
5	International community should involve Belgrade more	72%	14%	5%	1%	8%
6	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	66%	18%	8%	4%	4%
7	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	64%	30%	5%	1%	0%
8	The Contact Group should have one position	62%	16%	18%	2%	1%
9	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	60%	22%	17%	0%	0%
10	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	55%	24%	12%	1%	9%
11	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	55%	24%	14%	7%	1%
12	Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	53%	17%	23%	6%	1%
13	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	52%	40%	8%	0%	0%
14	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	51%	17%	8%	7%	17%
15	Fixed time table for negotiations	50%	26%	14%	3%	7%
16	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	49%	15%	19%	8%	10%
17	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	49%	24%	21%	3%	4%
18	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	49%	33%	12%	2%	3%
19	The EU should be more pro-active	47%	20%	11%	9%	11%
20	International penalties for not negotiating	44%	19%	15%	12%	10%
21	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	43%	39%	14%	1%	3%
22	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	43%	23%	18%	3%	12%
23	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	41%	22%	19%	7%	10%
24	The EU and US should have one position	41%	34%	8%	11%	6%
25	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	39%	30%	28%	4%	0%
26	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	38%	26%	21%	10%	4%
27	Belgrade will have to agree final status	37%	16%	16%	10%	22%
28	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	37%	31%	16%	6%	9%
29	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	33%	24%	30%	7%	6%
30	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	31%	26%	22%	3%	18%
31	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	29%	18%	24%	15%	15%
32	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	28%	31%	29%	10%	2%
33	The US should be more pro-active	28%	26%	21%	11%	15%
34	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	27%	30%	18%	10%	15%
35	An open forum for political parties and experts	23%	31%	23%	5%	18%
36	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	22%	12%	13%	19%	34%
37	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	21%	34%	24%	11%	10%
38	Talks in the US and EU	19%	21%	25%	10%	25%
39	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	16%	8%	14%	10%	52%
40	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	13%	20%	30%	9%	28%
41	Secret talks	8%	3%	6%	11%	72%

Table 8.6. Question 8 – Serbia Others

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	70%	24%	3%	1%	2%
2	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	67%	18%	11%	0%	3%
3	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	66%	22%	8%	1%	3%
4	Open talks	65%	24%	6%	2%	2%
5	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	62%	32%	5%	0%	1%
6	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	54%	23%	11%	2%	10%
7	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	54%	32%	10%	0%	4%
8	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	51%	34%	9%	2%	3%
9	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	50%	36%	10%	2%	2%
10	International community should involve Belgrade more	48%	23%	17%	5%	7%
11	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	47%	46%	3%	1%	4%
12	Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	44%	36%	13%	4%	2%
13	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	41%	31%	18%	4%	7%
14	International penalties for not negotiating	41%	39%	12%	7%	1%
15	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	41%	34%	15%	3%	6%
16	Fixed time table for negotiations	39%	35%	15%	3%	7%
17	The Contact Group should have one position	39%	34%	17%	4%	7%
18	Belgrade will have to agree final status	39%	26%	18%	6%	11%
19	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	39%	45%	9%	3%	4%
20	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	38%	37%	17%	6%	3%
21	The EU and US should have one position	35%	26%	15%	13%	10%
22	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	34%	39%	12%	6%	9%
23	The EU should be more pro-active	33%	36%	10%	12%	10%
24	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	31%	36%	13%	8%	11%
25	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	31%	39%	13%	14%	4%
26	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	30%	23%	31%	8%	8%
27	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	30%	33%	12%	14%	12%
28	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	29%	37%	12%	9%	13%
29	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	29%	35%	12%	10%	14%
30	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	26%	28%	24%	9%	13%
31	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	25%	30%	16%	12%	16%
32	An open forum for political parties and experts	24%	40%	24%	8%	4%
33	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	21%	38%	21%	13%	7%
34	The US should be more pro-active	20%	22%	19%	17%	21%
35	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	18%	27%	25%	18%	12%
36	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	17%	32%	29%	13%	9%
37	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	15%	17%	21%	23%	24%
38	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	15%	21%	25%	17%	22%
39	Talks in the US and EU	12%	20%	17%	28%	22%
40	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	11%	15%	17%	15%	42%
41	Secret talks	3%	14%	6%	18%	58%

9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo

Question

With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

No one will be at all surprised to find full independence at the top of the Kosovo Albanian list of 49 different principles for the final status of Kosovo at 81% essential (see tables 9.1 to 9.6). Behind this come some of the major characteristics of independence. Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army at 73% essential, be a member of the UN at 67% essential and make its own foreign policy at 60% essential. Fifth on the Kosovo Albanian list is NATO should stay as long as is needed at 57% essential. Kosovo Albanians want independence but like Kosovo Serbs they also want security and in this they welcome the assistance and support of the international community.

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Full independence	81%
2	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	73%
3	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	67%
4	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	60%
5	NATO should stay as long as is needed	57%

Serbian priorities

Kosovo can not leave Serbia is at the top of all three Serb lists at 69% essential for Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 73% for Serb IDPs. And second on the list for Serbia Serbs at 58% and Serb IDPs at 59% is Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship. This item is third on the Kosovo Serb list at 56% essential after meeting Standards before agreeing final status at 58%. After that various solutions that respect present borders and international law are most important and Serb IDPs do not want full independence at 39% essential. Fifth on the Serbia Serb list at 43% essential is the suggestion that Albanians should pay the financial costs of separating from Serbia.

Essential - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	69%	1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	65%	1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	73%
2	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	58%	2	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	58%	2	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	59%
3	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	56%	3	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	43%	3	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	43%
4	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	47%	4	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	43%	4	Not full independence	39%
5	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	47%	5	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	43%	5	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	38%

Others

Like Kosovo Albanians Kosovo others also believe Kosovo should have its own army (43% essential) and make its own foreign policy (47% essential). They also think NATO should stay as long as is needed (49% essential). But unlike Kosovo Albanians their top priority is not full independence but that there should be no return to the way things were before the war of 1999 at 60% essential. Like Serbs in general, Serb others also want Serbs to be able to keep their citizenship (48% essential) and for Kosovo to stay part of Serbia (41% essential). But they also want Kosovo and Serbia to join the EU and NATO, meet Standards before agreeing final status and for this not to include amnesty for war crimes all at 35% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Others			Serbia Others		
1	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	60%	1	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	48%
2	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	57%	2	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	41%
3	NATO should stay as long as is needed	49%	3	Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase stability and help negotiations	35%
4	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	47%	4	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	35%
5	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	43%	5	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	35%

Points of agreement and disagreement

In contrast to the various points of negotiation or procedural issues listed in question 8 there is little evidence of a Kosovo Albanian and Serb consensus around the guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo (table 9 below). But then this is to be expected. Everyone wants negotiations to resolve the problems of Kosovo but everyone would also like any settlement achieved to be on their terms. This is quite natural and it is from this point that negotiations have to start on what are sometimes referred to as the substantive issues.

Perhaps I have been too hard by highlighting everything in grey when a 40% plus level of unacceptable is reached. A simple majority vote only requires 50% plus 1. It should also be remembered that items that are unacceptable on their own are often acceptable as part of a comprehensive agreement or package that has the potential to deliver peace, security and increased prosperity. For example Protestants strongly opposed police reform in Northern Ireland but accepted it as part of the Belfast Agreement.

With all these points in mind what are the clear points of greatest potential agreement for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs? They are: NATO should stay as long as is needed at 0% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 3% for Kosovo Serbs; more investment to solve the problem of final status quicker at 2% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians but 17% for Serb IDPs; all Balkan states should join NATO at 3% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians but 23% for Serbia Serbs; an international economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of a final status agreement at 7% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians but only 6% for Serbia Serbs; all of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU at 11% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and less than 4% for all Serbs; no unification with neighbours is almost equally unacceptable to everyone at 16% for Kosovo Albanians, 20% for Kosovo Serbs, 36% for Serbia Serbs and 19% for Serb IDPs; Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship is unacceptable to only 18% of Kosovo Albanians; meet Standards before agreeing final status is only unacceptable to 22% of Kosovo Albanians and a solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law is only unacceptable to 26% of Kosovo Albanians.

In all of this there is plenty of substance to form a basis for negotiation and all these points should be borne in mind when examining various constitutional arrangements tested against public opinion in question 10.

Table 9. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
	Percent 'Unacceptable'				
1	Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	0%	51%	48%	54%
2	NATO should stay as long as is needed	0%	3%	23%	21%
3	Full independence	1%	92%	87%	81%
4	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	1%	91%	84%	76%
5	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	2%	14%	13%	17%
6	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	3%	89%	72%	67%
7	All Balkan states should join NATO	3%	15%	23%	11%
8	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	4%	67%	52%	59%
9	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	5%	71%	70%	66%
10	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	7%	22%	6%	33%
11	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	7%	57%	21%	50%
12	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	11%	4%	4%	3%
13	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	15%	47%	24%	43%
14	No unification with neighbours	16%	20%	36%	19%
15	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	18%	9%	6%	16%
16	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	18%	86%	79%	71%
17	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	22%	3%	3%	18%
18	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	22%	68%	34%	56%
19	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	26%	21%	6%	19%
20	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	34%	72%	68%	60%
21	No partition	34%	42%	21%	21%
22	Not full integration in Serbia	34%	68%	49%	67%
23	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	38%	61%	66%	61%
24	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	39%	87%	79%	66%
25	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	42%	9%	6%	3%
26	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	43%	48%	65%	60%
27	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	43%	18%	7%	31%
28	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	45%	33%	17%	35%
29	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	47%	42%	19%	32%
30	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	48%	77%	83%	72%
31	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	54%	84%	53%	56%
32	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	57%	79%	56%	78%
33	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	57%	71%	71%	66%
34	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	62%	41%	39%	47%
35	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	64%	73%	81%	76%
36	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	64%	68%	59%	59%
37	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	67%	11%	14%	36%
38	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	68%	62%	41%	61%
39	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	68%	34%	26%	28%
40	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	70%	16%	32%	38%
41	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	76%	29%	39%	47%
42	Decentralisation by ethnic region	78%	10%	17%	32%
43	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	78%	36%	24%	27%
44	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	80%	83%	63%	57%
45	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	81%	62%	63%	61%
46	Delay final status for at least ten years	82%	31%	52%	57%
47	Less than independence but more than autonomy	84%	31%	20%	41%
48	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	86%	4%	3%	5%
49	Not full independence	90%	24%	8%	27%

Table 9.1. Question 9 – Kosovo Albanian

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Full independence	81%	12%	5%	1%	1%
2	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	73%	21%	4%	1%	1%
3	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	67%	20%	7%	1%	5%
4	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	60%	20%	12%	5%	3%
5	NATO should stay as long as is needed	57%	34%	9%	1%	0%
6	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	55%	21%	16%	7%	2%
7	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	55%	20%	9%	1%	15%
8	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	44%	23%	19%	10%	4%
9	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	41%	24%	17%	11%	7%
10	Not full integration in Serbia	38%	13%	9%	6%	34%
11	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	33%	17%	20%	12%	18%
12	No partition	32%	12%	13%	8%	34%
13	All Balkan states should join NATO	28%	39%	27%	3%	3%
14	No unification with neighbours	25%	17%	26%	16%	16%
15	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	17%	30%	30%	11%	11%
16	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	16%	13%	13%	19%	38%
17	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	16%	18%	21%	11%	34%
18	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	15%	35%	27%	15%	7%
19	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	12%	18%	21%	28%	22%
20	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	12%	11%	19%	20%	39%
21	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	11%	20%	32%	19%	18%
22	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	11%	22%	11%	9%	47%
23	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	11%	25%	20%	23%	22%
24	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	8%	16%	18%	10%	48%
25	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	8%	3%	7%	20%	62%
26	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	7%	6%	8%	8%	70%
27	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	7%	8%	14%	14%	57%
28	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	7%	10%	19%	22%	42%
29	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	6%	12%	13%	15%	54%
30	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	6%	12%	19%	18%	45%
31	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	5%	7%	26%	36%	26%
32	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	5%	5%	15%	19%	57%
33	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	4%	7%	21%	25%	43%
34	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	4%	4%	8%	16%	68%
35	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	3%	10%	27%	18%	43%
36	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	3%	5%	3%	4%	86%
37	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	2%	2%	5%	14%	76%
38	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	2%	3%	5%	9%	81%
39	Less than independence but more than autonomy	2%	4%	4%	6%	84%
40	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	2%	3%	15%	16%	64%
41	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	1%	4%	9%	8%	78%
42	Not full independence	1%	6%	1%	2%	90%
43	Decentralisation by ethnic region	1%	4%	7%	10%	78%
44	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	1%	4%	8%	19%	68%
45	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	1%	6%	16%	14%	64%
46	Delay final status for at least ten years	1%	1%	5%	10%	82%
47	Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	1%	20%	62%	17%	0%
48	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	0%	1%	6%	12%	80%
49	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	0%	2%	12%	20%	67%

Table 9.2. Question 9 – Kosovo Serb

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	69%	21%	4%	2%	4%
2	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	58%	24%	9%	6%	3%
3	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	56%	27%	6%	2%	9%
4	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	47%	26%	14%	5%	9%
5	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	47%	17%	10%	5%	21%
6	NATO should stay as long as is needed	42%	38%	13%	5%	3%
7	Decentralisation by ethnic region	42%	33%	10%	5%	10%
8	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	37%	19%	11%	11%	22%
9	All Balkan states should join NATO	37%	22%	19%	7%	15%
10	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	36%	30%	11%	12%	11%
11	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	34%	33%	12%	16%	4%
12	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	33%	18%	4%	9%	36%
13	Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase stability and help negotiations	30%	38%	9%	6%	16%
14	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	30%	7%	14%	15%	33%
15	Delay final status for at least ten years	29%	20%	8%	11%	31%
16	Not full independence	28%	11%	19%	19%	24%
17	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	28%	28%	14%	15%	14%
18	Less than independence but more than autonomy	26%	8%	16%	19%	31%
19	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	26%	28%	20%	9%	16%
20	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	24%	41%	11%	7%	18%
21	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	23%	15%	10%	18%	34%
22	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	21%	10%	6%	2%	61%
23	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	20%	10%	11%	17%	42%
24	No unification with neighbours	20%	27%	20%	13%	20%
25	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	15%	27%	14%	15%	29%
26	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	14%	7%	15%	6%	57%
27	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	12%	6%	2%	3%	77%
28	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	11%	10%	10%	7%	62%
29	No partition	11%	22%	15%	10%	42%
30	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	10%	5%	11%	2%	71%
31	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	9%	4%	6%	9%	73%
32	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	9%	12%	4%	4%	71%
33	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	8%	14%	24%	14%	41%
34	Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	8%	20%	8%	12%	51%
35	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	7%	3%	3%	5%	83%
36	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	6%	6%	9%	11%	68%
37	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	6%	13%	7%	7%	67%
38	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	5%	21%	11%	17%	47%
39	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	5%	4%	2%	5%	84%
40	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	5%	4%	23%	19%	48%
41	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	4%	4%	0%	2%	91%
42	Not full integration in Serbia	4%	9%	12%	7%	68%
43	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	4%	10%	6%	13%	68%
44	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	4%	4%	4%	0%	89%
45	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	4%	4%	5%	1%	87%
46	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	4%	11%	8%	15%	62%
47	Full independence	2%	3%	1%	2%	92%
48	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	1%	9%	2%	2%	86%
49	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	1%	7%	12%	8%	72%
50	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	0%	8%	4%	9%	79%

Table 9.3. Question 9 – Kosovo Others

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	60%	4%	0%	0%	35%
2	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	57%	15%	6%	0%	22%
3	NATO should stay as long as is needed	49%	51%	0%	0%	0%
4	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	47%	23%	15%	0%	16%
5	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	43%	4%	32%	0%	21%
6	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	42%	16%	17%	24%	0%
7	Full independence	41%	27%	32%	0%	0%
8	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	36%	27%	36%	0%	0%
9	All Balkan states should join NATO	31%	16%	19%	20%	14%
10	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	30%	8%	12%	16%	35%
11	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	29%	0%	9%	44%	18%
12	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	27%	7%	49%	0%	17%
13	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	26%	27%	16%	8%	24%
14	No partition	22%	0%	22%	10%	46%
15	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	21%	11%	68%	0%	0%
16	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	21%	16%	16%	27%	19%
17	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	20%	13%	10%	21%	36%
18	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	18%	22%	27%	34%	0%
19	Not full integration in Serbia	17%	11%	43%	0%	30%
20	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	17%	0%	7%	21%	55%
21	No unification with neighbours	16%	14%	9%	9%	51%
22	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	13%	32%	45%	10%	0%
23	Decentralisation by ethnic region	13%	0%	7%	8%	72%
24	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	13%	0%	18%	17%	53%
25	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	11%	0%	0%	11%	78%
26	Delay final status for at least ten years	9%	13%	0%	9%	69%
27	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	9%	10%	35%	19%	26%
28	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	9%	0%	5%	6%	80%
29	Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	9%	0%	72%	10%	9%
30	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	8%	0%	0%	7%	84%
31	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	8%	16%	6%	15%	56%
32	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	4%	9%	0%	6%	81%
33	Not full independence	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
34	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
35	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	0%	0%	19%	7%	74%
36	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	0%	13%	0%	27%	60%
37	Less than independence but more than autonomy	0%	0%	4%	13%	83%
38	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	0%	8%	0%	0%	92%
39	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	0%	0%	4%	0%	96%
40	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	0%	8%	0%	7%	84%
41	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	0%	0%	13%	0%	87%
42	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	0%	29%	11%	51%	8%
43	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	0%	10%	9%	6%	74%
44	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	0%	0%	17%	19%	64%
45	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	0%	9%	12%	6%	73%
46	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	0%	9%	22%	23%	46%
47	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
48	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	0%	0%	22%	6%	72%
49	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	0%	0%	15%	6%	80%

Table 9.4. Question 9 – Serbia Serb

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	65%	23%	6%	3%	3%
2	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	58%	22%	8%	6%	6%
3	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	43%	19%	11%	9%	17%
4	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	43%	23%	15%	13%	6%
5	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	43%	17%	7%	10%	24%
6	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	42%	26%	20%	6%	6%
7	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	38%	31%	20%	9%	3%
8	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	38%	29%	13%	12%	7%
9	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	33%	30%	21%	10%	6%
10	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	33%	35%	17%	11%	4%
11	Not full independence	32%	25%	19%	16%	8%
12	No partition	27%	23%	12%	16%	21%
13	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	25%	30%	19%	12%	13%
14	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	23%	23%	16%	25%	14%
15	Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase stability and help negotiations	21%	30%	20%	15%	14%
16	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	19%	11%	22%	24%	24%
17	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	19%	18%	25%	20%	19%
18	Decentralisation by ethnic region	16%	23%	23%	21%	17%
19	No unification with neighbours	15%	13%	18%	18%	36%
20	NATO should stay as long as is needed	14%	26%	16%	20%	23%
21	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	14%	17%	19%	23%	26%
22	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	13%	17%	19%	19%	32%
23	All Balkan states should join NATO	12%	26%	20%	19%	23%
24	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	11%	22%	27%	20%	21%
25	Less than independence but more than autonomy	11%	19%	25%	25%	20%
26	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	10%	7%	7%	11%	66%
27	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	9%	11%	23%	23%	34%
28	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	9%	18%	17%	15%	41%
29	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	9%	8%	12%	19%	52%
30	Delay final status for at least ten years	8%	11%	12%	17%	52%
31	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	8%	14%	16%	22%	39%
32	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	8%	13%	11%	15%	53%
33	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	7%	8%	12%	17%	56%
34	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	7%	2%	3%	4%	83%
35	Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	6%	10%	16%	21%	48%
36	Not full integration in Serbia	5%	6%	13%	27%	49%
37	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	5%	13%	17%	27%	39%
38	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	5%	6%	8%	13%	68%
39	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	4%	4%	5%	17%	70%
40	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	4%	5%	10%	21%	59%
41	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	4%	5%	11%	14%	65%
42	Full independence	3%	2%	3%	6%	87%
43	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	3%	4%	7%	8%	79%
44	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	3%	4%	2%	7%	84%
45	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	3%	5%	8%	13%	71%
46	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	3%	5%	7%	14%	72%
47	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	3%	7%	9%	18%	63%
48	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	3%	4%	9%	20%	63%
49	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	2%	3%	5%	9%	81%
50	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	2%	3%	5%	10%	79%

Table 9.5. Question 9 – Serbia Serb IDPs

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	73%	13%	7%	2%	5%
2	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	59%	11%	11%	3%	16%
3	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	43%	28%	17%	9%	3%
4	Not full independence	39%	12%	10%	13%	27%
5	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	38%	10%	28%	5%	19%
6	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	36%	14%	14%	9%	27%
7	No partition	33%	23%	12%	11%	21%
8	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	32%	24%	17%	10%	18%
9	NATO should stay as long as is needed	28%	33%	8%	10%	21%
10	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	25%	44%	17%	11%	3%
11	Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase stability and help negotiations	24%	20%	16%	25%	15%
12	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	24%	24%	18%	4%	31%
13	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	23%	6%	9%	12%	50%
14	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	23%	9%	17%	23%	28%
15	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	22%	10%	11%	14%	43%
16	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	21%	17%	19%	11%	33%
17	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	21%	14%	42%	5%	17%
18	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	20%	21%	16%	8%	35%
19	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	19%	24%	15%	7%	36%
20	Decentralisation by ethnic region	19%	28%	15%	6%	32%
21	No unification with neighbours	18%	18%	31%	15%	19%
22	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	17%	10%	10%	5%	59%
23	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	17%	4%	5%	8%	67%
24	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	16%	5%	17%	16%	47%
25	All Balkan states should join NATO	16%	28%	26%	19%	11%
26	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	16%	12%	23%	12%	38%
27	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	14%	3%	7%	4%	71%
28	Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	14%	9%	15%	8%	54%
29	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	13%	5%	6%	10%	66%
30	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	13%	19%	22%	14%	32%
31	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	11%	4%	5%	5%	76%
32	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	11%	5%	14%	4%	66%
33	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	11%	1%	16%	11%	61%
34	Full independence	10%	5%	2%	1%	81%
35	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	10%	13%	12%	5%	61%
36	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	10%	8%	11%	5%	66%
37	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	10%	9%	16%	9%	56%
38	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	9%	11%	11%	8%	61%
39	Less than independence but more than autonomy	9%	22%	11%	18%	41%
40	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	9%	6%	17%	11%	57%
41	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	7%	14%	11%	8%	60%
42	Delay final status for at least ten years	6%	16%	7%	14%	57%
43	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	6%	24%	12%	11%	47%
44	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	5%	6%	19%	11%	59%
45	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	5%	3%	14%	6%	72%
46	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	4%	21%	11%	8%	56%
47	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	4%	2%	9%	7%	78%
48	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	4%	14%	12%	11%	60%
49	Not full integration in Serbia	3%	13%	13%	4%	67%
50	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	3%	1%	7%	13%	76%

Table 9.6. Question 9 – Serbia Others

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	48%	28%	14%	7%	2%
2	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	41%	17%	10%	12%	19%
3	Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase stability and help negotiations	35%	29%	18%	7%	11%
4	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	35%	50%	9%	2%	4%
5	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	35%	21%	19%	3%	21%
6	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	35%	38%	17%	6%	4%
7	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	29%	16%	23%	16%	17%
8	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	29%	38%	23%	1%	9%
9	No partition	28%	31%	8%	19%	14%
10	Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	28%	24%	31%	10%	8%
11	Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	28%	29%	20%	12%	11%
12	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	27%	27%	25%	7%	15%
13	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	25%	16%	23%	10%	26%
14	NATO should stay as long as is needed	24%	29%	21%	7%	20%
15	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	22%	23%	19%	15%	22%
16	Not full independence	21%	28%	25%	16%	10%
17	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	21%	37%	19%	10%	14%
18	Less than independence but more than autonomy	20%	25%	22%	10%	23%
19	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	20%	26%	18%	14%	22%
20	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	18%	22%	25%	8%	27%
21	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	18%	26%	37%	6%	13%
22	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	17%	19%	30%	14%	19%
23	All Balkan states should join NATO	17%	30%	24%	13%	16%
24	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	16%	29%	30%	10%	15%
25	Decentralisation by ethnic region	15%	28%	32%	7%	19%
26	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	14%	18%	15%	24%	29%
27	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	13%	17%	12%	15%	43%
28	No unification with neighbours	12%	12%	15%	17%	44%
29	Not full integration in Serbia	11%	17%	15%	14%	43%
30	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	11%	15%	29%	13%	31%
31	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	11%	18%	23%	13%	35%
32	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	8%	19%	27%	16%	31%
33	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	8%	11%	17%	21%	43%
34	Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	8%	15%	25%	15%	37%
35	Full independence	7%	9%	12%	14%	58%
36	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	7%	13%	20%	11%	49%
37	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	7%	7%	11%	12%	63%
38	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	6%	15%	22%	24%	34%
39	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	6%	15%	18%	11%	50%
40	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	6%	7%	8%	13%	66%
41	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	6%	10%	15%	27%	42%
42	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	6%	3%	25%	14%	52%
43	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	5%	11%	19%	19%	46%
44	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	5%	7%	19%	21%	48%
45	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	5%	20%	23%	16%	35%
46	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	5%	6%	17%	27%	45%
47	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	5%	11%	19%	16%	49%
48	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	3%	13%	20%	31%	34%
49	Delay final status for at least ten years	3%	5%	11%	21%	60%
50	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	2%	11%	15%	9%	64%

10. A constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo

Question

With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

Points of disagreement

In this question the options on offer were deliberately written and arranged across the full political spectrum from union of all Serbian lands at one extreme to union of all Albanian lands at the other, with a wide selection of various options in between. Inevitably, as all the answers to all the previous questions would indicate, the first preference for different constitutional packages is very different for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs (see tables 10.1 to 10.6). Thirty six percent of Kosovo Albanians consider full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo to be essential (table 10.a below). On the other hand 65% of Kosovo Serbs, 46% of Serbia Serbs, 64% of Serb IDPs and 35% of Serb others all consider full integration of Kosovo into Serbia to be essential as their preferred constitutional option (highlighted in grey). Kosovo others prefer union with Albania at 19% essential. Perhaps quite a few of the Kosovo others have an Albanian background. There are no real surprises in any of these results but this analysis does not help to solve any problems that will take us beyond what must essentially be seen as the opening negotiating positions of the two communities.

Table 10.a. Points of disagreement

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'. Per cent 'Essential'	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Kosovo Other	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs	Serbia Others
Union of all Serbian lands	1%	28%	5%	24%	27%	16%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	0%	65%	8%	46%	64%	35%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	0%	6%	2%	9%	12%	10%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	0%	3%	0%	7%	8%	8%
A protectorate of the EU	3%	9%	0%	3%	3%	2%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	4%	1%	6%	3%	9%	3%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	0%	6%	6%	4%	6%	4%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	0%	9%	0%	4%	3%	4%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	1%	12%	6%	3%	2%	5%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	4%	5%	0%	3%	2%	8%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	36%	0%	14%	2%	0%	0%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	17%	0%	19%	1%	0%	1%
Union of all Albanian lands	30%	0%	21%	1%	0%	1%

Points of agreement

If we now turn our attention to the levels of ‘unacceptable’ the position radically changes to identify points of possible compromise (table 10.b below). The lowest levels of unacceptable for both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs together are for a protectorate of the EU at only 20% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 58% for Kosovo Serbs, 60% for Serbia Serbs and 58% for Serb IDPs (highlighted in grey). The joint ‘popularity’ of this option is followed by two others: a state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo at 63% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians 48% for Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 62% for Serb IDPs; and a state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs at 52% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 64% for Kosovo Serbs, 67% for Serbia Serbs and 65% for Serb IDPs (also highlighted in grey).

Other ‘contenders’ might include an Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia but 88% of Kosovo Serbs find this option unacceptable and a state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia is unacceptable to 96% of Kosovo Albanians. Perhaps Kosovo Serbs are split on this particular idea between those who live in the North of Kosovo and those who do not as 57% of them find this proposal unacceptable while only 48% consider the prospect of their own canton unacceptable.

Table 10.b. Points of agreement

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’. Per cent ‘Unacceptable’	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Kosovo Other	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs	Serbia Others
Union of all Serbian lands	96%	13%	79%	13%	13%	34%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	98%	3%	77%	4%	1%	16%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	96%	66%	94%	40%	35%	29%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	92%	63%	91%	43%	46%	31%
A protectorate of the EU	20%	58%	57%	60%	58%	39%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	34%	88%	54%	68%	66%	42%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	96%	57%	89%	55%	60%	41%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	87%	59%	100%	62%	61%	45%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	63%	48%	70%	65%	62%	44%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	52%	64%	81%	67%	65%	45%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	13%	94%	44%	93%	88%	81%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	10%	98%	42%	96%	97%	88%
Union of all Albanian lands	8%	98%	33%	95%	97%	91%

But the big worry for both the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the international community is will any of these various constitutional arrangements bring about an exodus of Kosovo Albanians or Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo. Additionally is there any chance at all that a significant number of Serb IDPs might return to Kosovo under the right conditions. These possibilities were tested in question 11.

Table 10.1. Question 10 – Kosovo Albanian

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
Union of all Serbian lands	1%	1%	1%	2%	96%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	0%	0%	0%	1%	98%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	0%	0%	1%	3%	96%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	0%	0%	2%	6%	92%
A protectorate of the EU	3%	8%	41%	28%	20%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	4%	14%	27%	21%	34%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	0%	0%	1%	3%	96%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	0%	0%	4%	8%	87%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	1%	3%	21%	13%	63%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	4%	13%	15%	16%	52%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	36%	22%	20%	9%	13%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	17%	29%	28%	15%	10%
Union of all Albanian lands	30%	27%	22%	13%	8%

Table 10.2. Question 10 – Kosovo Serb

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
Union of all Serbian lands	28%	26%	12%	21%	13%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	65%	21%	7%	4%	3%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	6%	6%	10%	12%	66%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	3%	7%	10%	16%	63%
A protectorate of the EU	9%	6%	12%	15%	58%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	1%	4%	4%	3%	88%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	6%	11%	6%	20%	57%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	9%	9%	9%	14%	59%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	12%	13%	14%	13%	48%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	5%	11%	13%	8%	64%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	0%	1%	2%	3%	94%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	0%	1%	0%	1%	98%
Union of all Albanian lands	0%	1%	1%	1%	98%

Table 10.3. Question 10 – Kosovo Others

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
Union of all Serbian lands	5%	10%	6%	0%	79%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	8%	15%	0%	0%	77%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	2%	0%	3%	0%	94%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	0%	0%	3%	5%	91%
A protectorate of the EU	0%	0%	28%	15%	57%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	6%	3%	14%	22%	54%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	6%	0%	5%	0%	89%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	6%	5%	19%	0%	70%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	0%	10%	4%	4%	81%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	14%	13%	4%	24%	44%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	19%	10%	18%	11%	42%
Union of all Albanian lands	21%	20%	11%	16%	33%

Table 10.4. Question 10 – Serbia Serb

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
Union of all Serbian lands	24%	33%	20%	10%	13%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	46%	31%	14%	5%	4%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	9%	18%	18%	15%	40%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	7%	12%	18%	19%	43%
A protectorate of the EU	3%	5%	13%	21%	60%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	3%	4%	10%	16%	68%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	4%	6%	14%	20%	55%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	4%	5%	12%	18%	62%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	3%	5%	11%	16%	65%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	3%	6%	8%	15%	67%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	2%	1%	1%	2%	93%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	1%	1%	1%	1%	96%
Union of all Albanian lands	1%	1%	1%	2%	95%

Table 10.5. Question 10 – Serbia Serb IDPs

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
Union of all Serbian lands	27%	26%	26%	7%	13%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	64%	20%	13%	1%	1%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	12%	17%	18%	18%	35%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	8%	11%	18%	16%	46%
A protectorate of the EU	3%	11%	15%	13%	58%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	9%	5%	14%	6%	66%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	6%	4%	13%	16%	60%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	3%	5%	14%	17%	61%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	2%	9%	10%	17%	62%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	2%	10%	7%	16%	65%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	0%	4%	6%	3%	88%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	0%	0%	0%	3%	97%
Union of all Albanian lands	0%	0%	1%	1%	97%

Table 10.6. Question 10 – Serbia Others

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
Union of all Serbian lands	16%	18%	14%	17%	34%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	35%	25%	13%	11%	16%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	10%	15%	25%	21%	29%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	8%	13%	25%	24%	31%
A protectorate of the EU	2%	12%	23%	23%	39%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	3%	12%	20%	23%	42%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	4%	7%	26%	22%	41%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	4%	9%	22%	20%	45%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	5%	14%	14%	23%	44%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	8%	14%	15%	18%	45%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	0%	3%	2%	13%	81%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	1%	1%	3%	7%	88%
Union of all Albanian lands	1%	1%	2%	5%	91%

11 Displaced persons

Question 11.a

For persons living in Kosovo - *And for each of these options would you stay in Kosovo – YES or NO*

For Serb IDPs in Serbia – *And for each of these options would you return to Kosovo – YES or NO*

Conditions for staying/returning to Kosovo

Again the most popular constitutional option for both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs together seems to be a protectorate of the EU with 83% of Kosovo Albanians willing to stay, 45% of Kosovo Serbs willing to stay and 27% of Serb IDPs willing to return. The other options of a state as part of the EU, a choice of citizenship for Serbs with, perhaps, their own canton, also fair quite well. But clearly Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and the international community would like a better result than this. How can this be achieved?

Table 11.a. Conditions for staying/returning to Kosovo

Question 11a percent 'Yes' For each of these options would you stay/return in Kosovo?	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Kosovo Other	Serbia Serb IDPs
Union of all Serbian lands	9%	91%	37%	69%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	8%	97%	37%	86%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	9%	36%	26%	49%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	14%	39%	25%	38%
A protectorate of the EU	83%	45%	59%	27%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	74%	13%	66%	25%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	16%	42%	32%	27%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	24%	42%	17%	25%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	46%	48%	44%	23%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	57%	33%	39%	20%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	88%	6%	68%	5%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	92%	3%	75%	0%
Union of all Albanian lands	94%	3%	75%	0%

Question 11.b

And finally: It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return to) Kosovo providing I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship and was free to work and practice my culture, language and religion without any fear of discrimination. YES or NO

In search of the best possible solution

In the final question asked in this poll persons living in Kosovo and those who might return there were asked a very idealistic question which did not focus on the constitutional arrangements as such but on security and equality as best understood in terms of human rights. In this context 83% of Kosovo Albanians said they would stay along with 71% of Kosovo Serbs and 61% of Serb IDPs would return (see table 11.b below).

Table 11.b. Ideal conditions to stay in/return to Kosovo

Question 11.b percent 'Yes'	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Kosovo Other	Serbia Serb IDPs
It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return to) Kosovo providing I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship and was free to work and practice my culture, language and religion without any fear of discrimination.	83%	71%	100.0%	61%

Conclusion

As all the questions on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs would indicate, along with all the questions on matters of security, this ideal solution is at best an aspiration that could be strived for. It is a dream that would take at least a lifetime to achieve if ever. But what can be achieved is real progress towards this ideal in terms of social and political reform in combination with suitable constitutional arrangements that will go as far as such arrangements can to ensure security for all. By bringing together the most workable elements of all the questions reviewed in the second half of this report this can be done and this must be the objective of the negotiations ahead. Implementation, however, will take time. Fortunately both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs welcome the involvement of the international community, particularly the EU, whose influence in the region is clearly on the rise.

Appendix

Methodology

Questionnaire

Demographics

Methodology

Duration	From August 26 th to September 2 nd 2005
Territory	Serbia and Kosovo
Data collection method	Face to face at respondents home
Questionnaire	Prepared by Client, adapted, translated and printed by SMMRI
Sample type and sample selection procedure	
Sampling Universe	Serbia: 2002 Census figures and estimated population dynamics Kosovo: Estimation based on population figures estimated by WB, UNMIK, and SMMRI
Type of sample	Stratified three stage random representative
Stages	1: Polling station territory chosen with probability proportional to size (PPS) 2: Random route technique starting from the given addresses with equal probabilities (SRSWoR) 3. Household member with equal probabilities (SRSWoR) – Kish scheme
Stratification	First level in Serbia: Belgrade, Vojvodina, Central Serbia, and IDPs from Kosovo (disproportional allocation). First level in Kosovo: North, South, East, West, Serbian enclaves (disproportional allocation) Second level: urban and rural settlements
Sample size	Serbia: 1200 (general population n=1000, IDPs Serbs from Kosovo n=200) Kosovo: 1200 (general population n=1000, Serbs n=200)
Sampling error	Margin error for 95% confidence (response level 50%): +/- 2.8%; Response level 5%: n=1200 +/- 1.2%
Fieldwork realization	
Interviewers	SMMRI trained interviewers' network – on the average 100 to 150 interviewers are engaged per (10 interviews per interviewer) in Serbia and 100 local interviewers in Kosovo
Control	Fieldwork control is implemented on at least 12% of totally interviewed in all strata proportionally to sample size. According to project design, the following aspects of interviewers' work are verified: • fact that the interview has actually taken place; • proper application of the sampling plan in selecting the respondents; • approximate duration of the interview; • proper administration of the various sections of the questionnaire, and • Interviewers' general adherence to professional standards. Following data collection, 100% logic and consistency control are performed.

Kosovo – Kosova

Questionnaire

Version A and Version B – Split Blocks

- 1 – A and B – All of - Range of Problems – 31**
- 2 – A and B – Half and half - Problems of Final status – 42**
- 3 – A and B - Half and half - Problems of Relations – 48**
- 4 – A and B - Half and half - Problems of Security – 29**
- 5 – A and B - All of - The Future – 11**
- 6 – A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Relations – 33**
- 7 – A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Security – 32**
- 8 – A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Negotiations – 41**
- 9 – A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Principles – 50**
- 10 – A and B - All of - Constitutional Package – 13**
- 11 – A and B - All of - Displaced Persons – 14**

Kosovo - Kosova

Good morning/afternoon/evening my name is _____ from _____ and we are conducting a survey of public opinion to find out what the people of Kosovo and Serbia believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the region.

The research is being carried out by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe from Thessaloniki in Greece, KosovoLive in Pristina and BETA in Belgrade with advice from Dr. Colin Irwin from the Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland. He collected questions from Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and Serbia, and now we would like to find out what other people in Serbia and Kosovo think about these topics.

The results will be made available for public access on the internet, in the local newspapers and in reports that will be given to all the political parties in Kosovo and Serbia as well as all the major international organisations working in the region.

The survey involves interviewing one thousand two hundred people from both Kosovo and Serbia to complete representative samples in terms of age, gender, social class, political and ethnic affiliation and geographical area.

Topics to be covered include the problems faced by the people, their politicians and the international community in the region, what will happen if these problems are not properly addressed, a range of solutions to deal with these problems and finally some questions that tell us where you fit into our sample.

All your answers will be kept completely confidential.

1. The range of problems (A AND B)

Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.

	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance
1. The weak economy of Kosovo					
2. Public and personal security in Kosovo					
3. Kosovo's final status					
4. Organised crime in Kosovo					
5. Missing persons					
6. Return process of IDPs/refugees					
7. Lack of prosecution of war crimes					
8. The rights of victims					
9. Ineffective criminal justice system					
10. The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia					
11. The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)					
12. The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo					
13. The actions of the Kosovo government					
14. Decentralisation of government in Kosovo					
15. Police reform in Kosovo					
16. Serb and Albanian relations					
17. Serb Albanian language barrier					
18. Reconciliation					
19. Irresponsible politicians					
20. Corruption in Kosovo					
21. Unemployment in Kosovo					
22. Kosovo education standards					
23. The quality of Kosovo healthcare services					
24. The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications					
25. Kosovo power supply					
26. Kosovo privatisation					
27. Biased media in Kosovo					
28. Lack of cultural events in Kosovo					
29. Poor sports facilities in Kosovo					
30. Kosovo day care facilities					
31. Environment issues in Kosovo					

2. Kosovo's final status (A)

Now with regards to Kosovo's Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1. If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	A					
2. The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	A					
3. The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the Serbian economy	A					
4. Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	A					
5. Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	A					
6. An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war	A					
7. Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community	A					
8. Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	A					
9. Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	A					
10. Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	A					
11. Belgrade holds Kosovo's status hostage	A					
12. Lack of engagement by the international community	A					
13. Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	A					
14. The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	A					
15. Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations	A					
16. Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	A					
17. If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional	A					
18. Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent Kosovo	A					
19. An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	A					
20. Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo	A					
21. UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	A					

2. Kosovo's final status (B)

Now with regards to Kosovo's Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
22. Resolving Kosovo's final status will bring instability to the region	B					
23. An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia	B					
24. The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems to Serbian society	B					
25. If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	B					
26. Kosovo independence will result in more violence	B					
27. Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued international presence	B					
28. The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	B					
29. Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo	B					
30. Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	B					
31. Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	B					
32. Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	B					
33. International community distracted by Iraq	B					
34. The international community does not speak with one voice	B					
35. Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	B					
36. Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	B					
37. No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	B					
38. It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	B					
39. An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	B					
40. An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	B					
41. Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs	B					
42. Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovo's debts	B					

3. Serb and Albanian relations (A)

Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1. Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	A					
2. The legacy of so many killings	A					
3. Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few	A					
4. Apologies without security will not help	A					
5. Serb desire to return to pre-war status	A					
6. Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today	A					
7. Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo institutions	A					
8. Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade	A					
9. KLA officers in the police	A					
10. Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	A					
11. Serbs want a greater Serbia	A					
12. Albanians feel inferior to Serbs	A					
13. Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	A					
14. Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	A					
15. Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves	A					
16. Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks	A					
17. Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	A					
18. Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their failures	A					
19. Failure to prosecute war criminals	A					
20. Serb culture of violence and dominance	A					
21. Albanian culture of violence and revenge	A					
22. Serb provocations	A					
23. Albanian provocations	A					
24. Playing politics with bodies	A					

3. Serb and Albanian relations (B)

Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
25. Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	B					
26. Not knowing the fate of lost persons	B					
27. Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	B					
28. Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo	B					
29. Serb refusal to deal with Albanians on equal terms	B					
30. Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians	B					
31. Serbs exaggerate the security problem	B					
32. KLA officers in government	B					
33. Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	B					
34. Albanians want a greater Albania	B					
35. Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government	B					
36. Serbs feel inferior to Albanians	B					
37. Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies	B					
38. Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public	B					
39. Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems	B					
40. Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	B					
41. Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions	B					
42. Influence of war criminals in politics	B					
43. Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	B					
44. Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia	B					
45. All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	B					
46. Inflammatory language from politicians	B					
47. Inflammatory language from clerics	B					
48. Inflammatory language from the media	B					

4. Security (A)

Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’

	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
1. People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	A					
2. No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	A					
3. Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	A					
4. Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	A					
5. Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	A					
6. Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	A					
7. Organised political crime	A					
8. Slow working of the justice system	A					
9. Not enough minorities in government posts	A					
10. UNMIK do not provide effective security	A					
11. Corruption in UNMIK	A					
12. Lack of coordination in KFOR	A					
13. 4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and Opposition/Shadow	A					
14. Security forces are not accountable to the people	A					
15. War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	A					

4. Security (B)

Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’

	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance	Not Even True
16. Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	B					
17. Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	B					
18. Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear	B					
19. Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	B					
20. Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	B					
21. Albanian fear from external military threat	B					
22. Weak justice system	B					
23. Lack of trust in the justice system	B					
24. No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	B					
25. UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals	B					
26. KFOR are not trained for policing duties	B					
27. The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures	B					
28. The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security	B					
29. Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	B					

5. A future without agreement (A AND B)

And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be ‘Very probable’, ‘Probable’, ‘Not sure’ about, ‘Improbable’ or ‘Very improbable’.

	Very probable	Probable	Not sure	Improbable	Very improbable
1. Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia					
2. Decrease in international assistance					
3. Lack of investment					
4. Increased emigration					
5. Increased criminalisation					
6. Escalation of ethnic tensions					
7. Social unrest					
8. Increased political instability					
9. Increased regional instability					
10. Increased international military presence					
11. Renewed violent conflict					

Choosing your options for peace and stability in the region

Most of the remainder of this questionnaire will present you with various options on what could be done to improve the prospects for peace and stability in the region.

For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.

For the purposes of this poll ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ mean:

‘Essential’ – *You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better future for the region and should be fully implemented.*

‘Desirable’ – *This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Essential’, but you think this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice.*

‘Acceptable’ – *This option is not what you would consider to be ‘Desirable’, if you were given a choice, but you could certainly ‘live with it’.*

‘Tolerable’ – *This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you would be willing to put up with it.*

‘Unacceptable’ – *This option is completely unacceptable under any circumstances. You would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the region.*

You may use each of the terms ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ and ‘Unacceptable’ as many times as you wish in each question.

6. Serbs and Albanians relations (A)

With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1. Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	A				
2. Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	A				
3. Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	A				
4. The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	A				
5. The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	A				
6. Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	A				
7. Decentralisation at the municipal level	A				
8. Offer higher education in both languages	A				
9. Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	A				
10. Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	A				
11. Special status for Serb religious sites	A				
12. Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	A				
13. Each side should give up their maximum demands	A				
14. Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	A				
15. Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	A				
16. Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	A				
17. Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	A				

6. Serbs and Albanians relations (B)

With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
18. Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	B				
19. Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	B				
20. Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	B				
21. Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	B				
22. Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	B				
23. An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	B				
24. Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	B				
25. Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	B				
26. Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	B				
27. Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	B				
28. Government support for bilingual media	B				
29. Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	B				
30. Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	B				
31. Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	B				
32. Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	B				
33. Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	B				

7. Security (A)

With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1. Better training for the police	A				
2. Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	A				
3. Parallel reform of police with local government reform	A				
4. Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	A				
5. Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	A				
6. Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	A				
7. Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	A				
8. Two official languages	A				
9. One legal government	A				
10. Properly paid safe judges	A				
11. All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	A				
12. Special property court to deal with property disputes	A				
13. Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	A				
14. Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	A				
15. Decommissioning of privately held weapons	A				
16. Mitrovica should become a unified city	A				

7. Security (B)

With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
17. Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	B				
18. Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	B				
19. The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	B				
20. KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	B				
21. Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	B				
22. Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	B				
23. Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	B				
24. Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	B				
25. One unified judicial system	B				
26. More efficient and effective judicial system	B				
27. Local courts initially supervised by the international community	B				
28. Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	B				
29. To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	B				
30. Demilitarisation of border regions	B				
31. One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	B				
32. North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	B				

8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo (A)

With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1. Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	A				
2. An open forum for political parties and experts	A				
3. Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	A				
4. Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	A				
5. International community should involve Belgrade more	A				
6. Fixed time table for negotiations	A				
7. Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	A				
8. Belgrade's priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	A				
9. Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	A				
10. Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	A				
11. Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	A				
12. Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	A				
13. The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	A				
14. Open talks	A				
15. Talks in the US and EU	A				
16. The Contact Group should have one position	A				
17. The EU should be more pro-active	A				
18. The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	A				
19. Belgrade will have to agree final status	A				
20. Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	A				

8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo (B)

With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
21. Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians'	B				
22. Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	B				
23. Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	B				
24. International penalties for not negotiating	B				
25. Negotiations should be given plenty of time	B				
26. If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	B				
27. Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	B				
28. Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	B				
29. Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	B				
30. New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	B				
31. Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	B				
32. Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	B				
33. The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	B				
34. Secret talks	B				
35. Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	B				
36. The EU and US should have one position	B				
37. Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	B				
38. The US should be more pro-active	B				
39. There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	B				
40. There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	B				
41. Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	B				

9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo (A)

With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1. NATO should stay as long as is needed	A				
2. Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase stability and help negotiations ¹	A				
3. No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	A				
4. Full independence	A				
5. Not full independence	A				
6. Meet Standards before agreeing final status	A				
7. Standards can be met at the same time as final status	A				
8. Kosovo can not leave Serbia	A				
9. Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	A				
10. Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	A				
11. Decentralisation by ethnic region	A				
12. Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	A				
13. Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	A				
14. Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	A				
15. Kosovo should be a member of the UN	A				
16. Less than independence but more than autonomy	A				
17. Not full integration in Serbia	A				
18. Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	A				
19. Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	A				
20. Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	A				
21. National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	A				
22. Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	A				
23. Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	A				
24. Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	A				
25. International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	A				

¹ By error this question was not included in the Albanian version of the questionnaire.

9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo (B)

With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
26. All Balkan states should join NATO	B				
27. All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	B				
28. No unification with neighbours	B				
29. Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	B				
30. No partition	B				
31. Independence only when agreed conditions are met	B				
32. Delay final status for at least ten years	B				
33. Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	B				
34. Solution inside present borders of Kosovo and Serbia	B				
35. Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	B				
36. Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	B				
37. Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	B				
38. Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	B				
39. Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	B				
40. A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	B				
41. Solution that respects the present borders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	B				
42. A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	B				
43. Judicial independence within existing borders with Serbia	B				
44. A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	B				
45. National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	B				
46. Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	B				
47. Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	B				
48. Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	B				
49. Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	B				
50. More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	B				

10. A constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo (A AND B)

With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	11. YES/NO ²
1. Union of all Serbian lands						
2. Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia						
3. A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)						
4. A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU						
5. A protectorate of the EU						
6. An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia						
7. A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia						
8. A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority						
9. A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo						
10. A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs						
11. Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo						
12. Union of Kosovo with Albania						
13. Union of all Albanian lands						

11 Displaced persons (A AND B)

For persons living in Kosovo - And for each of these options would you stay in Kosovo – YES or NO

For displaced Serbs in Serbia – And for each of these options would you return to Kosovo – YES or NO

And finally: It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return to) Kosovo providing I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship and was free to work and practice my culture, language and religion without any fear of discrimination. YES or NO

² For persons in Kosovo and IDPs/refugees in Serbia ONLY.

DEMOGRAPHY GENERAL																							
D1. Gender: 1. Male 2. Female																							
D2. Age: _____																							
D4. Marital status 1. Single, not living together with the partner 2. Married, lives together with the partner 3. Divorced, widowed (used to be in marriage)																							
D5. Education – last FINISHED school <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Unfinished primary</td> <td>5. Finished secondary</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Finished primary</td> <td>6. Unfinished university</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Unfinished secondary</td> <td>7. University – associate degree</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Unfinished secondary but has got training</td> <td>8. University – bachelor degree at least</td> </tr> </table>			1. Unfinished primary	5. Finished secondary	2. Finished primary	6. Unfinished university	3. Unfinished secondary	7. University – associate degree	4. Unfinished secondary but has got training	8. University – bachelor degree at least													
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D6A. Current occupation <table border="0"> <tr> <td><u>Employed:</u></td> <td><u>Self-employed:</u></td> <td><u>Not employed:</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td>11. Blue-collar worker</td> <td>21. Highly qualified intellectual</td> <td>31. Pupil</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12. White collar</td> <td>22. Possesses smaller firm, shop...</td> <td>32. Student</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13. Highly qualified intellectual</td> <td>23. Possesses larger firm, company....</td> <td>33. Housewife</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14. Manager</td> <td>24. Farmer, fisherman</td> <td>34. Pensioner</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>25. Self-employed in other way</td> <td>35. Unemployed</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td>40. Other: _____</td> </tr> </table>			<u>Employed:</u>	<u>Self-employed:</u>	<u>Not employed:</u>	11. Blue-collar worker	21. Highly qualified intellectual	31. Pupil	12. White collar	22. Possesses smaller firm, shop...	32. Student	13. Highly qualified intellectual	23. Possesses larger firm, company....	33. Housewife	14. Manager	24. Farmer, fisherman	34. Pensioner		25. Self-employed in other way	35. Unemployed			40. Other: _____
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D6B. If the respondent is employed Are you employed ...? 1. Full time job 2. Part-time job																							
D7a. Household type: <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Lives alone</td> <td>5. Multigenerational family</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Married couple – no children</td> <td>6. Single parent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Married couple – with children</td> <td>7. Married couple – empty nest</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Married couple – grown up children (over 27)</td> <td>8. Other</td> </tr> </table>			1. Lives alone	5. Multigenerational family	2. Married couple – no children	6. Single parent	3. Married couple – with children	7. Married couple – empty nest	4. Married couple – grown up children (over 27)	8. Other													
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D7b: Total number of household members: _____																							
D7c: Total number of children in the household: _____ <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Children in pre-school age (up to 6) _____</td> <td>Children in high school (secondary education)(from 15 till 17) _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Children in school (7-14) _____</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>			Children in pre-school age (up to 6) _____	Children in high school (secondary education)(from 15 till 17) _____	Children in school (7-14) _____																		
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D8a. Total PERSONAL income in month: CARD D8a (FOR KOSOVO SURVEY IN EURO) <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. No income in month</td> <td>9. 7001 to 9000 Dinars</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Bellow 1000 dinars</td> <td>10. 9001 to 11000 Dinars</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. 1001 to 2000 Dinars</td> <td>11. 11001 to 13000 Dinars</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. 2001 to 3000 Dinars</td> <td>12. 13001 to 16000 Dinars</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. 3001 to 4000 Dinars</td> <td>13. 16001 to 19000 Dinars</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. 4001 to 5000 Dinars</td> <td>14. Over 19001 Dinars</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. 5001 to 6000 Dinars</td> <td>15. Refusal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8. 6001 to 7000 Dinars</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>			1. No income in month	9. 7001 to 9000 Dinars	2. Bellow 1000 dinars	10. 9001 to 11000 Dinars	3. 1001 to 2000 Dinars	11. 11001 to 13000 Dinars	4. 2001 to 3000 Dinars	12. 13001 to 16000 Dinars	5. 3001 to 4000 Dinars	13. 16001 to 19000 Dinars	6. 4001 to 5000 Dinars	14. Over 19001 Dinars	7. 5001 to 6000 Dinars	15. Refusal	8. 6001 to 7000 Dinars						
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D8d. Do you have in your household... <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Computer</td> <td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Internet connection</td> <td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Cellular telephone</td> <td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Fixed (classic) telephone</td> <td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. At least on car</td> <td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. Satellite dish or cable TV</td> <td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal</td> </tr> </table>			1. Computer	1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal	2. Internet connection	1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal	3. Cellular telephone	1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal	4. Fixed (classic) telephone	1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal	5. At least on car	1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal	6. Satellite dish or cable TV	1. Yes 2. No 3. Refusal									
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D9. Ethnic Affiliation

1. Serb
2. Montenegrin
3. Bosniak
4. Hungarian
5. Albanian
6. Croat
7. Goran
8. Turk
9. Roma
10. Ashkali
11. Egyptian
12. Other (specify) _____
13. Refused

7

DEMOGRAPHY - **ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR SERBS IDPs**

AD1. When did you come to Serbia? (Month and year) _____

AD2. Where did you live before coming to Serbia? (Full name of the city / village, region and municipality)

AD3. What was your occupation before coming to Serbia?

	<u>Self-employed:</u>	<u>Wasn't employed:</u>
11. Blue-collar worker	21. Highly qualified intellectual	31. Pupil
12. White collar	22. Owner of smaller company, shop...	32. Student
13. Highly qualified intellectual	23. Owner larger company, company....	33. Housewife
14. Manager	24. Farmer, fisherman	34. Pensioner
	25. Self-employed in other way	35. Unemployed
		40. Other: _____

AD4. Where have you been during the NATO intervention, 1999? (Full name of the city / village, region and municipality) _____

AD5. 1. Respondent lives in collective centre 2. Respondent lives in rented premises

3. Respondents is the owner of the premises in which he/she lives

DEMOGRAPHY - **ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR KOSOVO SURVEY (REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE AND SERBS IN KOSOVO)**

AD6. Since when are you living in this city / village? (Month and year) _____

AD7. Where did you live before? (Full name of the city / village, region and municipality)

AD8. Where have you been during the NATO intervention, 1999? (Full name of the city / village, region and municipality) _____